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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

In addition to the parties on appeal identified in the caption, Tim Shea,
Shane Thorpe, Scott Quinney, and ReMax Realty were parties in the case below.
A third party named Dale Qui~lan owned the dba ReMax Elite.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

WHETHER PLAINTIFFS
MAINTAIN THIS ACTION.

HAVE

STANDING

TO

Standard of review: Determinations of the legal requirements for standing

are reviewed for correctness. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808.
Preservation:
~

Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, Brown v. Division

of Water Rights, 2008 UT App 353, ,I 6, 195 P.3d 933, and therefore can be raised
at any time. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68,

~

,r 50,

123 P.3d 416. The issue of

whether Plaintiffs had statutory standing was also raised in the lower court. (E.g.,
R. 1407; R. 1414-24; R. 1498-1503; R. 1885; R. 6819; R. 6864; R. 7009.)
ISSUE 2:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE
ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER
COMPLETION OF THE SALE WAS "PREVENTED BY
DEFAULT OF THE SELLER," OR WHETHER THE
BUYER WAS READY, WILLING, ABLE, AND
ACCEPTED BY THE SELLER.

Standard of Review: A court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
·-.:ij)

correctness. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol, 2000 UT 61, ,r 8, 6 P .3d 1129.
Preservation: This issue was raised below. (E.g., R. 3655-70; R. 4054-74;

~

R. 4434; R. 4517; R. 4634-35; R. 4958; R. 8382, pp. 10-35, 40-43, 53-59, 68-70,
77-81; R. 8386, pp. 8-41; R. 8389, pp. 17-29, 46-49, 61.)
1

;··®

ISSUE 3:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT
SCHYANEVELDT INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN RULING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT HE SIGNED THE REPC
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY RATHER THAN AS A
MEMBER OF THE LLC.

Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on summary judgment presents

a question of law and the legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of
summary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10

,I 8, 152 P.3d 312 (cited in Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App. 230, 285
P.3d 802).
Preservation: Schvaneveldt's lack of personal liability was raised below.
(E.g., R. 927-929; R. 1890; R. 3664; R. 4426, p. 11; R. 5153-5154; R. 5512; R.

8382, pp. 39-40; R. 8383, pp. 5-6, 11-13; R. 8388, p. 11.)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES
Assumed name statute

Utah Code § 42-2-10:
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter are complied with:
( 1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit,
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proc~eding in any of the courts of
this state; ....
Revised Limited Liability Company Act (2006)

Utah Code§ 48-2c-116:

2

A member or manager of a [limited liability] company is not a proper party
to proceedings by or against a company, except when the object is to enforce
a member's or manager's right against, or liability to, the company.
Utah Code§ 48-2c-601:
[N]o organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is personally
liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner,
for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions
of the company or of any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of
the company.
Utah Code§ 48-2c-802(3):
[U]nless the articles of organization expressly limit their authority, any
member in a member-managed company, or any manager in a managermanaged company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property,
and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in
favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of
authority of the person who signs and delivers the document.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings and disposition below

This case arises out of a real estate transaction that went awry. The case has,
...;;

to put it mildly, a long and complicated history. For purposes of this appeal,
however, the relevant history is relatively simple:
ReMax Elite (an assumed name whose owner was not identified) brought an
interpleader action against two parties to a real estate contract, Emmett Warren and
or Assigns (Buyers) and Still Standing Stables, LLC (Seller). The interpleader

3
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action was to resolve the parties' dispute over an earnest money deposit being held
by ReMax Elite.
Nearly two years later, Buyers and Seller settled their dispute. Afterward,
ReMax Elite asserted claims for a commission against Still Standing Stables,
Charles Schvaneveldt (a member of the LLC), and Cathy Code (Schvaneveldt's
girlfriend and later wife).
Numerous amendments, motions, and cross motions were filecl throughout
the litigation. See pp. 5-16, infra. Through the course of litigation, the issues for
trial were narrowed significantly. As a matter of law, the trial court ruled that I) a
valid commission agreement existed; 2) the plaintiffs had done everything they
were required to do in order to earn a commission and therefore a commission was
owing; 3) the sale had fallen through because the seller could not guarantee
"insurable" access to the property; and 4) there was no basis upon which one of the
defendants, the LLC, could be liable for the commission.
At trial, the court instructed the jury as to each of these findings, and barred
Schvaneveldt from offering any evidence challenging them. After the Plaintiffs'
case in chief, the court granted a motion for directed verdict by Cathy Code, one of
the two remaining defendants. Thus, while the trial was supposed to resolve who
owed the commission, by the time it went to the jury, Schvaneveldt (in his
. G.,·

individual capacity) was the jury's only remaining choice. Given that the judge

4
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had already instructed the jury that a commission was owed and the only question
left was who owed it, the jury, not surprisingly, chose the sole defendant on the
special verdict form. 1
In this appeal, Schvaneveldt challenges the trial court's pretrial rulings,
arguing that the jury should have been permitted to determine whether a
i;.

commission was owed at all and, if so, whether any such liability was by the LLC
for whom Schvaneveldt was acting, rather than Schvaneveldt personally. There is
an addition~! threshold issue, however, involving the Plaintiffs' standing to
maintain this action. Because the latter issue requires additional background, and
as required by U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7), Schvaneveldt hereby provides (as briefly as
possible) the procedural history of the case wit];i record cites:
As noted, this appeal arises from what began as an interpleader case brought
by the dba ReMax Elite against the parties to a Real Estate Purchase Contract
("REPC"), Emmett Warren/Assign WBL Development LLC (identified by ReMax

.d)

Elite as "Purchaser") and Still Standing Stables (identified as "Seller").

(R. 1.)

From this simple beginning, the case grew in complexity.
Still Standing Stables answered and counterclaimed against ReMax Elite and
Buyers' real estate agent, Tim Shea. (R. 30.) Buyers answered, adding a cross-

1

As the trial court summarized, "[T]his Court ruled prior to going into trial, that
the only two people who would have any potential liability in this case would be
the two principal people here in this courtroom ...." (R. 8385, pp. 27-28:23-1.)
5
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claim against Still Standing Stables and a third-party complaint against Charles
"Chuck" Schvaneveldt.

(R. 52.)

Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables

answered Buyers' third party complaint and cross-claim (R. 95), and filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings (R. 110), which was denied. (R. 190.)

c-

Vj,J

The pleadings were amended at various stages throughout 2007, some of
these amendments occurring while discovery proceeded. Early in 2008, Buyers
and their assign reached a settlement with Still St~ding Stables and Schvaneveldt,
and the claims between them were dismissed by the court. (R. 538.)
ReMax Elite and Buyers' agent Shea then amended their pleadings to
demand a sales commission from Still Standing Stables under the For Sale By
Owner commission agreement ("FSBO"). (R. 554.) The trial court ultimately
barred Shea from pursuing this claim, as a claim for commission can only be
brought by a licensed broker, not an agent. (R. 1081.)
After a large portion of discovery was complete, Still Standing Stables
added as additional third-party defendants Hilary "Skip" 0. Wing, Shane Thorpe,
Scott Quinney, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation dba ReMax Elite, Aspenwood
Realty, LLC, Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty. (R. 828.) It was alleged that
ReMax Elite was simply a dba of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation. The other
third-party defendants participated, it was alleged, in the management of
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, either as principals, subsidiari~s, or dbas. Id.

6

{.(
~

ReMax and Shea then amended their complaint and third-party counterclaim
again, adding as a defendant Schvaneveldt and as a Third Party Defendant his wife,
Cathy Code. (R. 1232.) When answering this amended pleading, Schvaneveldt
included as a third-party complaint the same causes of action against the
Aspenwood parties previously alleged by Still Standing Stables. (R. 1303.)
Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling as a
matter of law that they were entitled to a commission. (R. 1561.) This was
successfully stayed pending discovery, and defendants responded when the stay
was lifted nearly two years later. (R. 3655.)
Meanwhile, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt filed a motion for
summary judgment contending that ReMax Elite, a dba, could not collect a
commission because it was not a broker nor owned by a broker. (R. 1407.) The
trial court denied the motion. (R. 1885.)
The court also denied motions by both Schvaneveldt and Code seeking
dismissal as individual defendants on the grounds that they were acting on behalf
of the limited liability company Still Standing Stables, not as individuals. (R.
1885; R. 1890.)
Based upon arguments made by Plaintiffs in opposing the dismissal of
Schvaneveldt and Code (i.e., that those defendants were liable and not the LLC),

7

Still Standing Stables then filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of its
own liability (R. 2394).
While this motion was pending, and despite already being named as thirdparty defendants in the litigation, Skip Wing, Elite Legacy Corporation, and
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation moved to add themselves as plaintiffs,
asserting that ReMax Elite was their dba. (R. 2318.) Shortly thereafter, these
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all of Still Standing Stables' claims
against them (R. 2887). Still Stan~ing Stables filed a cross motion on the issue of
breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 3094.)
While these motions were pending, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt
filed their response to Plaintiffs' third amended answer and counterclaim. (R.
3604.) (This was the answer and counterclaim in which the Elite and Aspenwood
entities had been joined as plaintiffs, along with Skip Wing.)

~I

It took several years, but the characters on the stage of the litigation were
beginning to gel.

On the plaintiff's side, Wing was a principal broker, and

~.

associated with him, he alleged, were a mixture of persons and entities that
together constituted his brokerage: entities, associate brokers and agents. These
Ga,

included (by their narratives) Tim Shea, Elite Legacy Corporation, Aspenwood
Real Estate Corporation, Aspenwood Elite Legacy Corporation, Shane Thorpe,
~I

Scott Quinney, Aspenwood Realty, LLC, Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty.

8

Wing alleged that Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation owned the ReMax Elite
dba. (Later, ReMax Elite Legacy Corporation would also claim to own the ReMax
Elite dba (R. 2364).) On the defendants' side figured Still Standing Stables, its
member Schvaneveldt, and his wife, Code.
After a two-year hiatus (caused in part by stays for mandatory mediation,
discovery, and Tim Shea's bankruptcy), the plaintiffs filed an opposition (R. 3644)
to Still Standing Stables' motion for summary judgment on its liability (R. 2394),
and Still Standing Stables, Schvaneveldt, and Code filed an opposition (R. 3655) to
the plaintiffs' motion to secure partial summary judgment on their claim to collect
the commission (R. 1561 ).

While these motions were pending, the plaintiffs

responded to the counterclaims and third-party complaint brought by Still Standing
Stables, Schvaneveldt, and Code. (R. 3989.)
In March 2012, the trial court held oral argument on Shea's and Still
Standing Stables' cross motions for summary judgment. The court ruled orally
~

that, as a matter of law, the sole reason the transaction had failed was that
"insurable" access to the property could not be obtained. (R. 83 89.) In light of this
ruling, the court dismissed all of Still Standing Stables' tort claims because Still
Standing Stables could not show that any alleged tortious conduct by the Plaintiffs
caused it any harm. Id.

9

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion (R. 4401) to dismiss the defendants'
second third-party complaint, arguing _that it amounted to the same pleading that
had been dismissed by the court in its recent summary judgment ruling. All three
defendants opposed this motion, as the grant of summary judgment was not final
and did not affect the rights of Schvaneveldt or Code. (R. 4509.) The defendants
also filed a cross motion to amend their counterclaims. (R. 4507.)

~I

Yet another motion was filed in this timeframe, the Plaintiffs' second motion
for partial summary judgment (R. 4504), in which they asked the court to rule that
~I

Schvaneveldt and Code were responsible for paying the commission. The court
did not ultimately rule on that motion.
At a hearing in July 2012, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment (R. 1561), ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to a commission
as a matter of law. (R. 8382.) The court ruled that changes that had been made by
Shea to the REPC after the parties signed it were "a red herring" and legally
irrelevant. The court further foreclosed any possibility of alleging fraud at the trial.
Finally, the court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 4972.)
The district court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint, and denied defendants' motion to amend. (R. 5047.)
The day before trial, the court dismissed Still Standing Stables as a
defendant. (R. 8383, pp. 17-20; R. 5613.) The case then proceeded to trial against

10

Schvaneveldt and Code.

At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case in chief,

Schvaneveldt moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. (R. 5317.)
Code moved for a directed verdict, which was granted. (R. 5424.) The court
vl;

told the jury that it had concluded there was no basis for liability against Code, and
had dismissed her from the case. "Therefore, as a result of my ruling, you will

~

consider only the liability of Chuck Schvaneveldt in this case." (R. 8386 pp. 4243.)
The jury entered a verdict against the sole rema1rung defendant,
Schvaneveldt, assessing damages in the amount of $30,000.

(R. 5388.)

Schvaneveldt filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 5393),
which was denied. (R. 5615.) The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, alleging
that the damages the jury assessed were not consistent with the evidence. (R.
5450.) Rather than grant the motion, the trial court instead opted to increase the
judgment to $130,875. (R. 5950.) The court later added an award of attorney fees,
for a total judgment against Schvaneveldt of $362,485.96. Id.
Schvaneveldt filed his own motion for new trial (R. 6200), which was
denied. (R. 6510). Other post-trial motions went forward, and ultimately Still
'lid

Standing Stables was awarded $2,659.73 in costs. (R. 6732.) When an attempt
was made to collect these costs, Skip Wing denied that he was liable for them
because, Wing said, he was not a party to the contract on which ReMax Elite was

11
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sumg. This prompted Still Standing Stables to bring a motion to identify real
parties in interest, the nub of which was a contention that none of the plaintiffs had
standing to pursue a commission. (R. 6819.) Schvaneveldt filed a companion
motion, seeking dismissal of all of the named commission claim plaintiffs with
prejudice and to have the judgment struck or otherwise made void. (R. 6864.)
Schvaneveldt's central argument was that a man named Dale Quinlan was
the principal broker who had established, registered, and owned the dba ReMax
Elite, the status of which had vexed the entire litigation. At least two of the
Plaintiffs had claimed that they owned the dba.

Now Quinlan appeared with

documentation from the State of Utah that it was his. Quinlan also submitted an
affidavit indicating that he had never transferred any commission agreement or
contract rights to any other individual nor entity. Quinlan owned the ReMax Elite
dba at the time of the execution of the FSBO and REPC in 2006. As such, the
defendants argued that he was required to be the party seeking the commission.
Thickening the plot, Quinlan was no longer a principal broker at the time of the
FSBO and REPC. Because Quinlan was neither a principal broker nor named as a
party, the defendants argued, the commission claims asserted by his dba were void.
Id.

While these motions were pending, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt
entered into a settlement agreement with Quinlan and his dba ReMax Elite to

12
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dismiss ReMax Elite's claims related to the commission. (R. 6990-91.) Settlement
was limited to those parties identified as parties to the commission agreement,
reserving any claims that Still Standing Stables or Schvaneveldt might have against
: ~~\

\tifV

others (Wing and the amalgam of others constituting his brokerage who remained
as litigants). Id
The trial court denied Still Standing's and Schvaneveldt's motions. (R.
7009.) The court first concluded that Wing could not avoid liability for attorney
fees under the FSBO by characterizing himself as a nonparty to the agreement.
The court also said that it was "dismay[ed]" at the reassertion of standing
arguments by the defendants at this point in the proceedings. While standing may
be raised at any time during litigation, the court reasoned that it had lost
jurisdiction once a final judgment was entered. After expressing its hesitancy to
even engage in any analysis at all, the court concluded that the evidence suggesting
that Wing was not the principal broker could have been found earlier, and therefore

~

defendants' standing arguments were untimely. Id.
Schvaneveldt then filed a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings in the final
judgment. (R. 7088.) He requested that all three named plaintiffs be removed
from the commission judgment because none of them was the actual party to the
FSBO agreement. He also requested that the court recognize as an undisputed fact
that Dale Quinlan was the certified and record owner of the dba ReMax Elite. He

13
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finally requested that a letter of transfer dated 9 March 2006, purporting to transfer
the dba to Wing, and the Aspenwood articles of incorporation (which might also be
used to substantiate a transfer of the dba) be authenticated.

Schvaneveldt

contended that neither document was executed by Quinlan, and submitted an
expert report to that effect. (R. 7115.)
Just over a month after filing his rule 52(b) motion, Schvaneveldt filed a rule
60(b) motion, the substance of which was that overwhelming documentation now
showed that Skip Wing was not the principal broker of the dba ReMax Elite, and
therefore there was no proper party plaintiff in the action. (R. 7287.)
No ruling was issued on the motions for approximately nine months. At that
point, Schvaneveldt submitted to the court supplemental exhibits and an additional
memorandum in support of his rule 52(b) motion. (R. 7854.) This evidence also
showed that Skip Wing was never a broker for the dba ReMax Elite. Id.
The court denied the rule 52(b) motion. (R. 8234.) The court found that
information contained within the Department of Commerce (including a
determination by the State that the purported 2006 transfer documents were
forgeries, and that the dba had never been transferred by Quinlan), could have been
discovered before trial. The court ruled that a dba is an asset, and could be held in
a "somewhat segregated capacity, where legal title is held in one particular name,
but equitable interests are actually owned by someone else." (R. 8240-41.) The
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court speculated that Quinlan "may have been simply functioning in his capacity as
a participant in the business entity that owned the dba of ReMax Elite, when his
name was placed on that document [registration of the dba]." With respect to
Wing, the court stated that "to the extent that Skip Wing is identified as a party in
these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims, that identification is Mr. Skip
J:J

Wing, in his representative capacity, as principal broker for the brokerage, or as an
agent or representative of the brokerage, and does not represent his individual and
personal ownership of those claims." (R. 8243.)
The trial court also denied the rule 60(b) motion. (R. 8254.) The court
concluded that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was not available. With respect to Rule
60(b)(5), the court ascribed no legal significance to Quinlan's settlement with the
defendants because Quinlan's ownership status had not been conclusively
established.

With respect to Rule 60(b)(4), the court noted that arguments

regarding standing had already been rejected in previous rulings. The court said
v<1

that there were two separate questions at issue: Is there a properly registered dba
for the business entity that asserted the claim, and who owns that dba?. There may
be argument about who owns a dba, the court said, but this did not necessarily go
to whether the lawsuit could be maintained by the dba in question. (R. 8263.)
Related to other post-trial motions concerning the ownership of the dba, Still

w)

Standing Stables not only had settled all outstanding claims with Quinlan and

~
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ReMax Elite, but it had also had secured ownership of and registered the ReMax
Elite dba. Based on these facts, Still Standing filed a motion to be substituted as
plaintiff under Rule 25 as the rightful owner of the dba. (R. 8110.) The motion
was denied. (R. 8444, pp. 30-36.) All parties appealed some aspect of the court's
rulings and final judgments.

Statement offacts relevant to issues on appeal

G.J1

The For Sale By Owner ("FSBO '') agreement
In January 2006, former defendant Cathy Code, then a girlfriend of Chuck
Schvaneveldt, ran an advertisement for a piece of property in Weber County, Utah.
(R. 3266, pp. 14-16.) The Property was owned by a limited liability company
called Still Standing Stables. (R. 660

,r

1.) Schvaneveldt was a member of the

LLC. (R. 3126 ,r 1.)
A real estate agent named Tim Shea saw the advertisement and contacted
Code, purporting to have some pot<?ntially interested buyers. (R. 3266-67, pp. 1617.) On January 20, 2006, Shea sent a proposed Real Estate Purchase Contract
("REPC") to Code along with a For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement &
Agency Disclosure ("FSBO"). (R. 3271, p. 45.) A copy of the FSBO is attached
hereto as Add.Exh. 5.2

2

There was a dispute below as to whether this FSBO was one that Schvaneveldt
authorized Code to sign, and that she did sign. That is immaterial to resolution of
16
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The FSBO contained the following prov1s1on regarding a comm1ss1on
("brokerage fee"):
2.
BROKERAGE FEE. The Seller agrees to pay the Company,
irrespective of agency relationship(s), as compensation for services, a
Brokerage Fee in the amount of$_ _ or 3% of the acquisition price of the
Property, if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns
(the "Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or
exchange the Property. The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be
due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date of recording of
closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is
prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately be
due and payable to the Company.
(Add.Exh. 5, p. 1 § 2.)
The FSBO also contained a provision addressing certain seller warranties:
4. SELLER WARRANTIES / DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants that
the individuals or entity listed above as the "Seller" represents all of the
record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable
title and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The
Seller agrees to execute the necessary documents of conveyance. The Seller
agrees to furnish buyer with good and marketable title, and to pay at
Settlement, for a standard coverage owner's policy of title insurance for the
buyer in the amount of the purchase price. The Seller agrees to fully inform
the Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property.
The Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's Property
Condition Disclosure form.
(Add.Exh. 5, p. 1 § 4.)
The FSBO incorporated the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure Form
referenced in Section 4.

See id., § 13 ("ENTIRE AGREEJ\.1ENT.

This

the issues on appeal, and therefore it is assumed for purposes of argument that
Code signed the FSBO and that she was authorized to do so by Schvaneveldt.
17
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Commission Agreement, including the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure
F onn contain the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject
matter of this Commission Agreement. This Commission Agreement may not be
modified or amended except in writing signed by the parties hereto.") The Seller's
disclosure form is discussed below.

TheREPC
~I

The agent, Shea, identified his buyers as "Emmett Warren and or Assigns."
(R. 857.)

Shea initially conveyed a $6,000,000 offer from Buyers through a

proposed REPC on January 20, 2006.

Schvaneveldt submitted a counteroffer,

which lapsed by its terms when Buyers did not respond. (R. 4710-11.)
On February 6, 2006, Shea submitted another offer from Buyers. Other than
a reduced offer amount ($4,362,500), the proposed REPC was identical to the
earlier lapsed one. (Compare Add.Exh. 6 and R. 38.) Both REPCs were prepared
by Shea. (R. 3270-71, pp. 44-48.) According to Shea, he was acting solely as an
agent of Buyers in connection with the deal. (R. 3286, p. 245; see also Add.Exh. 6
(FSBO) p. 1 § 5 (stating that Broker and Agent "are representing the Buyer" and
are "the Buyer's agent").)3
The REPC prepared by Shea identified the Property as "Land LLC, Still
Standing Stables also described as Parcel # 23-006-0006 City of Huntsville,
3

But see R. 7 (modified copy of REPC on which Shea checked boxes stating that
Listing Agent and Listing Broker represented "Seller" as well as "Buyer").
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County of Morgan, State of Utah, ZIP 84310." (Add.Exh. 6, § 1.) (Morgan was
later crossed out and Weber written in.)
Shea admits that, when meeting with Schvaneveldt, he (Shea) represented
that he had "cash buyers." (R. 3268, p. 22.) According to Schvaneveldt, Shea
represented that Buyers included an owner of the Arizona Diamondbacks
~

professional baseball team. (R. 3128,

,r,r 16, 23.)

Schvaneveldt contended that a

cash transaction was consistent with a space left blank next to the "loan" provision
in the financing section of the proposed REPC. (R. 3113.)
On February 7, 2006, Schvaneveldt signed an Acceptance of Offer to
Purchase. (R. 861.) The Plaintiffs claim that the agent, Shea, did not keep the
original of this document; instead, the Plaintiffs produced and relied on a black and
white copy. (R. 1096 ,r 7; R. 1135.)
On its face, the signature of Schvaneveldt on the copy appears to be
irregular. In particular, the words "Chuck Schvaneveldt" are on the far left side of
,..i)

the page, inside the margin, followed by an unexplained white space:
~
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFERJREJ~CTION
.
. . :CHECfCOt(E:
·
.
. ·. '--~~~TANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller ~pis th, -~,q(ng offer on the terms al1d eondtttanc spedfied _

.. .

-

{llm$)

(Seller's Signature)

(Data)

(Time)

- - - - - - - - - ~.,,;;f~UJ~M
.........=-~a'tt--Ai:?W.;;;.,,a:;.-::1'_-,,;lt,.s,,~---...;;i..~......
t:..~f~f'4..,..~""""!-~flb/~....•'-~'.A..,_1,_t/.....~___.LS'
(SeOea' Names) (PLEASE PRIHTJ

(Nob Address)

(Zip Codo)
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(See Add.Exh. 6 (REPC), signature page.)
During cross-examination at trial, Schvaneveldt attempted to explain that the
copy only contained part of his signature, because on the original he had written
"Member" following his name, which appeared to have been "whited out" on the
copy. (R. 8385, pp. 13-15:9-9; see also R. 3126 (averring that his signature on the
REPC was "forged" [sic].) During a break, the trial court agreed with Plaintiffs
that Schvaneveldt's testimony was barred by the court's earlier ruling that the LLC
had no liability as a matter of law. (Id., pp. 27-41.) (The court had also barred
Schvaneveldt from mentioning that the Plaintiffs did not produce an original of the
REPC (R. 8384, p. 177).)
The court directed the parties to "stipulate" that there was no evidence of
whited out text on the REPC, despite Schvaneveldt' s testimony to the contrary and
the face of the document itself. (R. 8385, pp. 40-41.) The court told the jury:
Notwithstanding the testimony of Schvaneveldt, the parties stipulate
that there is no evidence that any document has been whited out nor are the
defendants aware of any such documents. Pursuant to the Court's earlier
ruling, there is no liability on Still Standing liability [sic] a limited liability
company; therefore, do not consider anything you have heard to suggest
liability on Still Standing liability company as opposed to the defendants that
are present in the courtroom.
(Id., p. 42:18-1.)4

4

In his closing argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel cited this statement by the court as
proving that Schvaneveldt was a liar: "I looked at this and I say, is that your
signature? Yeah, that's my signature and then he says, and you know, I put
20
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The trial court also prohibited Schvaneveldt from offering evidence at trial
regarding other alterations the agent admitted making to the original REPC after it
was signed by Schvaneveldt. For example, as discussed in Point II below, Shea
added "TBD" in the blank space next to "loan". The original reads:
.
•

r""\

.t.PURCHASe PNCe The purdlas& ;mco forth• PtopOrty ls WP25QQ
: Tha pun:ttasa price wUI -bO paid a, faitowr.

$.25JJQQ l•> EarnHt Money Depo,n. Undor certain eondUlon~ dt•crU,ad ln thla Contract THIS
. DEPc,slT MAY BECOM~ TOTALLY NON-R!FUNOASLE.
·
, _ _ _ _ (b) N•w ~nn. 8uyGf ogrves to apply for.one or mare cf the foffowing loans:
(XJ t:ONVeffTIONAL ( lOTHER(spedfy) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If tile Joan tt·to 1ndudo any particular tenn&. then check below and giw detait&:
f t ~PECIFl~ LOAN 'nRMS
.

$_ _ _ _ (~) Salftr Ftnanofnt. (aoo attached $oiler Financing Addendum, If applieabla)
$._ _ _ _ (d) Othw(splclfr). .
· .
·
·
.

'----<•) Balano. of Pvrdlua Peke tn Cash at S•ttl•m•nt.
$:136250.Q PURCHASE PRIC8. Total of Unoa (4) tflrough (a)

The version as modified by Shea reads:

'member' there or - or something to the effect 'member' should be there, I don't
know what happened. I think somebody whited out that document. Jury leaves the
room ... , and you come back in and the stipulation by the parties was is that there is
no evidence that any of these documents have been whited out. So why go to the
jury and tell the jury, I think that's been whited out, you even heard him say and
over here, look here, there's been something there, and he went through all those
documents and wanted to claim-why? Because he falsely testified about an
important matter in this case because he doesn't want you to put his personal
signature on those documents." (R. 8387, p. 45:7-23.)
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With respect to agency disclosure, the original signed REPC reads:

As later modified by Shea, the REPC read:

GJ,

In a pretrial ruling,. the trial court ruled that Shea's modifications, and the
plaintiffs' representation of the modified version as the original, were irrelevant
because Schvaneveldt did not learn about either until after the lawsuit was filed,

~i

and because as a matter of law Shea's modifications were just made for "internal"
purposes. (R. 8384, p. 72:914.)5

\\!J'

5

GJ,

To rule as a matter of law that Shea's modifications were merely routine
administrative annotations seems inconsistent with Shea's own evolving story as to
how they occurred: At various times, he denied making the modifications after the
REPC was signed, acknowledged that they were made after it was signed,
acknowledged it appeared to be his handwriting, suggested that someone else in his
office might have done it, or speculated that "Chuck [Schvaneveldt] could have
wrote that TBD." (R. 3274, pp. 149-150; R. 3290-3291, pp. 308-311.)
22
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Pertinent provisions of the REPC

The REPC submitted by the Buyer and signed by Schvaneveldt includes
several relevant sections.

Section 2 (typed in smaller font to more accurately

depict its appearance on the REPC) provides:
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price for the Property is $4362500
The purchase price will be paid as follows:
$25,000
(a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract THIS DEPOSIT
MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
$____
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for one or more of the following loans:
[X] CONVENTIONAL [ ] OTHER (Specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details:
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

$____

$____
$____
$4362500

(c) Seller Financing. (see attached Seller Financing Addendum, if applicable)
(d) Other(specify). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(e) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement.
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (e)

Section 3 of the REPC, addressing Settlement and Closing, states:
3. SETTLE:rvIBNT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on the
Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(c), or on a date upon which
Buyer and Seller agree in writing. "Settlement" shall occur only when all
of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed
and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions
or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under
these documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been
delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office in the form of
collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by
Seller under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or
to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds ....
The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the
proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or
to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents
have been recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions
described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be
completed within four calendar days of Settlement.
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Section 8 of the REPC addressed Buyers' due diligence obligations and right
to cancel:

8.

BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE
DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this Contract (check
applicable boxes):
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content
of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7;
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical
condition inspection of the Property; ...
If any of items 8(a) through 8(g) are checked in the affirmative, then
Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply.
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to
as Buyer's "Due Diligence." Unless otherwise provided in this
Contract, Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer and shall
be conducted by individuals or entities or Buyer's choice. Seller
agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence and with a final preclosing inspection under Section 11.
8.1. Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence
Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of
Buyer's Due Diligence; and (b) determine if the results of Buyer's
Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer.
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of
Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the
Due Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing
written notice to Seller, whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall
be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of
objections.
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence
Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract as provided in
Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the
Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed
approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections 8(a)
through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing contingency,
shall be deemed waived by Buyer.
24

Section 10 of the REPC addressed certain seller warranties:
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to
the Property and will convey good and marketable title to Buyer at
Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept
title to the Property subject to the following matters of record:
easements, deed restrictions, CC&R' s (meaning covenants, conditions
and restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the
Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section
8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases
affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. Buyer agrees
to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association
dues, utilities, and other services provided to the Property after
Closing. Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages,
trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants.
Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and
homeowners association dues ....
Section 13 of the REPC addressees the authority of signers:
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation,
partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or other entity, the
person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her
authority to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller.
Section 14 of the REPC is an integration clause:
14. CO:rvlPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its
addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, constitutes the
entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings
or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed
except by written agreement of the parties.
Section 24 of the REPC set forth the deadlines for Seller's Disclosures,
Buyer's Due Diligence, and Settlement. (The deadlines were handwritten.)
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24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the
following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
(a) Seller Disclosure Deadline 15 DAYS FROM WRITTEN
ACCEPTANCE (Date)
(b) Due Diligence Deadline 60 DAYS FROM WRITTEN
ACCEPTANCE (Date)
(c) Settlement Deadline 90 DAYS FROM WRITTEN
ACCEPTANCE (Date)6
Seller's Property Condition Disclosure form
As noted above, the FSBO incorporates the seller's disclosure form. See pp.
17-18, supra. That disclosure form was prepared by Shea on February 9, 2006,
two days after Schvaneveldt signed the REPC. (R. 2950, 3127 ,r 24.) It included
this information:
SELLER NAME STILL STANDING STABLES, LLC
PROPERTY ADDRESS Parcel No 23-006-0006

***
6. BOUNDARIES & ACCESS
E. Are you aware of any unrecorded easements, or claims for
easements, affecting the Property? Yes. If "Yes," please describe, to your
knowledge, the nature and approximate location of any such easement(s):
66 foot wide easement to Garth Allen, Jenna & Jeff Holt, Lesley Ann Becky
Jarl Allen - previously provided.

6

Under Section 21, "Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this
Contract. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties ....." No claim is
made that the deadlines in the REPC were extended.
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F.
To your knowledge, is there direct access to the Property
from a public street/road? No.
G.
If direct access to the Property is not from a public
street/road, to your knowledge, is there direct access to Property through
(check applicable box): Yes. Private Easement.
(R. 2952 § 6.)

According to Shea and the Plaintiffs, Buyers became concerned during the
;.iJ

due diligence period about whether insurable access to the property existed. (R.
3278-85; R. 3445-46; also R. 8384, p. 11.) Schvaneveldt contended there was
access, due to his purchase of an additional five acres after a previous adverse
court ruling. (R. 3128 ,I 25.) Various title insurance companies, however, were
only willing to offer policies that excluded a guarantee of access to the property.
(R. 2903-07.)

Despite their claimed concerns about insurable access, Buyers did not
submit a written notice of objections or cancel the REPC pursuant to Section 8.2.
The trial court ultimately ruled that Buyers had waived their objections regarding
access pursuant to Section 8 of the REPC. (R. 8386, pp. 83-84:17-1.)7

7

Section 8(a) of the REPC stated that Buyers' obligation to buy was conditioned
on their acceptance of the Seller's disclosures after completing due diligence.
Under the REPC, if the Buyer has not canceled the REPC or objected by the
expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, "[t]he Buyer's Due Diligence shall be
deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections 8(a)
through 8(g) ... shall be deemed waived by Buyer." § 8.3. When the due diligence
period passed without cancellation, Shea admits telling Schvaneveldt that the
Buyers' earnest money check was now on the line. (R. 3289, pp. 303-304.) The
court ruled: "In failing to object to the access issue during the due diligence
27

On May _3, 2006, Seller executed closing documents and a runner delivered
the documents. (R. 180.) It is undisputed that Buyers did not show up at the
closing.
On cross-motions filed by Shea and Still Standing Stables, the trial court
ruled as a matter of law that the sole reason that the sale had fallen through was
due to an inability to obtain insured access to the property. (R. 8389 pp. 52-54;

also R. 5049-50.)

The court applied this ruling to other parties, including

Schvaneveldt, as law of the case. (R. 5050-51.) As noted above, the court ruled
that Buyers had waived their objections to the access issue before the closing date. 8

The lawsuit and Plaintiffs ' identity/standing
I~

Facts regarding the identity of the Plaintiffs and their (non)status as principal
brokers are set forth in the procedural history above, pp. 11-16, supra, and
additionally at pp. 35-36, infra.

:

period, the buyer essentially assented to continue with the sale despite the access
issue. I mean, that's the natural consequence under the terms of the agreement ...
Where the due diligence period passed without objection, the contingency here was
apparently waived and the buyer gave up his right to object." (R. 8386, pp. 8384: 17-1.) See Load Zone Marketing and Management, LLC, v. Clark, 2014 UT
App 194, ,r 13, 333 P.3d 1255 (due diligence conditions are waived if buyer fails to
exercise his right to cancel before the deadline).
8

The plaintiffs also claimed that Seller had refused to provide a "general" warranty
deed as referenced in the REPC. Seller's attorney Gretta Spendlove, however, had
proposed a special warranty deed, and Buyers had stated a willingness to accept it.
(R. 18.) A fact issue therefore existed, and the trial court did not rule on it.
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The key pretrial rulings

As noted above, various motions were filed by the parties during the
litigation. Those included a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the
.. ~:'!I

i,s,

Plaintiffs arguing that they were entitled to a commission as a matter of law, and
motions/cross-motions for summary judgment by Still Standing Stables, Chuck

~

Schvaneveldt, Cathy Code, Tim Shea, and Skip Wing.
Of import to this appeal, the court ruled that the Plaintiffs had done
everything they were required to do in order to earn the commission.

The

remaining issue was who, between Schvaneveldt and Code, was obligated to pay it.
(R. 8383, pp. 27-28 ("I have previously ruled that the plaintiffs satisfied all of their
obligations to the FSBO and have therefore earned a commission....

And

therefore, the only remaining issue from the July 12th decision was, who's going to
have liability for this commission that has been earned? And I think at this point, I
think it's not the LLC, I think it's either Cathy Code, Chuck Schvaneveldt or both
..J

of them and I think that's what this trial is going to be about this coming week.")
Consistent with the narrow issues allowed to be presented to the jury, the
court instructed the jury at the beginning of trial that one or more of the remaining
two defendants, Schvaneveldt and Code, had entered into a commission agreement
with the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs had done everything required to earn the
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commission, that a commission was owed, and that the jury's sole task was to
determine who owed it:
The plaintiffs and defendants were involved in an attempt to sell a piece of
property. Defendants, Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code, are the sellers
of the property, which is owned by Still Standing Stable, LC, that's a limited
liability company. Chuck Schvaneveldt is one of the owners of Still
Standing Stable, LC. Plaintiffs are the real estate brokers who attempted to
find someone to buy the land. Plaintiffs entered into a contract with one or
more of the defendants to find a buyer for the land. That contract is called
the for sale by owner and you'll hear throughout the trial, it referred to as the
FSBO or the FSBO commission agreement.
In performance of the FSBO agreement, plaintiffs produced a ready, willing
and able buyer that defendants accepted.
The buyer and Chuck
Schvaneveldt, one of the defendants, signed a real estate purchase contract.. ..
The REPC between Schvaneveldt and the buyer is a binding contract and
satisfies the terms of the FSBO. Ultimately, the ·transaction failed and the
buyer did not purchase the land because the defendants could not provide
title insurance that guaranteed access to the property. Importantly, however,
the FSBO agreement does not require that the land actually be sold in order
for plaintiffs to earn a commission, only that the buyer be ready, willing and
able to purchase; thus, the Court previously ruled that plaintiffs satisfied
their obligations under the FSBO and therefore, have earned a commission.
In this trial, your duty as jurors is to determine whether the defendants are
responsible to pay the commission to plaintiffs.
(R. 8384, pp. 123-125.) As noted above, the court directed a verdict in favor of
Code at the end of the plaintiffs' case in chief; consequently, Schvaneveldt was the
only remaining option for the jury. See p. 11, supra.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed legal error in this case in a number of respects. As
a threshold issue, the trial court erred in not dismissing this action and striking the
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judgment because the Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue the Defendants for
recovery of a real estate commission under the FSBO agreement. Utah statutory
law is clear that only a principal broker can seek recovery in the courts for a real
(;iJ

estate commission. The dba ReMax Elite is identified as the brokerage company
party to the FSBO. The undisputed evidence shows that none of the Plaintiffs were
the principal broker of dba ReMax Elite when the FSBO was executed and none of
the Plaintiffs ever became the principal broker of dba ReMax Elite. Rather, dba
ReMax Elite was established, registered and owned by Dale Quinlan, a former
principal broker. Mr. Quinlan has not sued the Defendants and, subsequent to the
verdict, Mr. Quinlan assigned all of his interest and the interest of dba ReMax Elite
in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing Stables, L.C. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs,
never being the principal broker for dba ReMax Elite, lack standing under Utah
law to sue the Defendants under the FSBO and cannot cure that standing defect.
Additionally, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and talcing
from the jury the determination of whether a real estate commission was due and
owing to the Plaintiffs under the FSBO. The court ruled that the Plaintiffs had
done everything they were required to do and were entitled to a commission under
the FSBO regardless of whether the sale fell through due to default of the Buyer or
the Seller.
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The court's ruling is wrong because, first and foremost, it overlooks the
plain language of the FSBO.

The plain language of the FSBO provides for

payment of the commission from the proceeds of the sale and if the sale falls
through, ReMax Elite is only entitled to a commission if the sale is "prevented due
to default of seller." That language is in direct contravention with Plaintiffs' claim
and the trial court's finding that it was irrelevant whether the sale was prevented by
default of the Buyer or the Seller.
Furthermore, the court's ruling that the Plaintiffs were entitled to a
commission as a matter of law is wrong because: 1) the Plaintiffs did not prove that
the Sellers defaulted in any way and the court later ruled that the Buyers had
waived any objections to the property access issue; and 2) the court incorrectly
conflated the legal principals of "insurable access" and "good and marketable title"
to find that the Seller breached the obligation to convey good and marketable title.
The court's grant of summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' right to a real
estate commission is also wrong based an alternative standard that the Plaintiffs
had produced a "ready, willing, able and accepted" buyer. The record shows that
issues of fact exist regarding whether the Plaintiffs produced a "ready, willing, able
and accepted" buyer.
Lastly, the trial court erred in denying the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment to dismiss claims against Schvaneveldt in his individual capacity, and
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conversely ruling as a matter of law that any liability of Schvaneveldt for the real
estate commission was in his individual capacity rather than as a member of
Standing Still, LLC. The law and facts clearly demonstrate that any liability of
~

Schvaneveldt for the real estate commission is, as a matter of law, as a member of
and in his representative capacity of Standing Still, LLC, the owner of the property

._;;;

being offered for purchase.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION.
Whether a party has standing to bring or maintain an action is a matter of the

court's jurisdiction. The party pursuing the claim bears the burden of establishing
standing. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1167, 1171
(Utah 1986).
In this case, the plaintiffs cannot establish standing for two independent
reasons: First, by statute the Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below. Second,
..;;

the claimholder and associated rights have now been acquired by one of the
defendants, Still Standing Stables, who does not wish to continue the action.

A.

The Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below.

Utah statutes impose specific restrictions on who may bring an action
seeking a real estate commission. Under Utah law, only a "principal broker" can
contract for, and later seek in the courts, a real estate commission:
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No sales agent or associate broker may sue in is own name for the
recovery of a fee commission or compensation for services as sales
agent or associate broker unless the action is against the principal
broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery
of a fee, commission or other compensation may only be instituted
and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or
associate broker is affiliated.
U.C.A § 61-2-18 (now Utah Code§ 61-2f-305). 9
The purpose of this brokerage provision is to closely regulate the real estate
industry to protect the public. Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development
Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980); 12 AmJur 2d Brokers § 8. Consistent with the·

statute, Utah courts deny nonbrokers statutory standing to sue for commissions.
See, e.g., Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848 (Utah

1978). Likewise, the trial court barred one of the original plaintiffs, Tim Shea,
from suing for a commission under this statute. (R. 1885.)
Because only a principal broker can collect a real estate commission in Utah,
the number of persons who can bring such actions is small. Apart from this unique
privilege of suing to collect commissions, a broker is free to conduct business as he

9

The Utah statutory scheme in place at the time of the REPC and FSBO
contemplated a "principal broker" as the person who engages in the selling or
listing for sale real estate for commission. A principal broker must be licensed by
the state. Utah Code § 61-2-1 (2006). An associate broker is an independent
contractor engaged by the principal broker. Utah Code § 61-2-2 (2006). A
brokerage is the business activity (or office) of the broker, whether it be in the
form of an entity or collection of entities and independent contractors that is
supervised by the broker.
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or she sees fit under the various options provided for by law, for example, as a
corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership, or the like. A common
tool used by business entities to enhance their brand and to make doing business
easier is an assumed name.
State statutes allow persons and entities to do business under assumed
~

names, commonly known as a "doing business as" or "dba" names. However, the
legislature also requires central registration of dbas to provide notice to the world
that someone or something is acting under a fictitious identity. See generally Utah
Code§ 42-2-5, et seq.
By statute, any person or entity who fails to properly register a dba is barred
from bringing or maintaining an action:
any person who carries on, conduct, or transacts business under an
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter complied with: (1)
shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim,
cross-complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state ....
Utah Code § 42-2-10.
Often, this defect can be cured through proper registration while the action is
pending.

See, e.g., Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy

Recovery Special Serv. Dist., 1999 UT App 136, ,r,r 15-16, 979 P.2d 363 (allowing
amendment of pleadings after failure to register dba was cured). In this case,
however, there was no cure and, as discussed below, there can never be one.
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As noted above, the action was commenced by a dba, ReMax Elite. The
FSBO itself was also in the name of "ReMax Elite dba." See pp. 16-1 7 supra
(Add.Exh.5, p. 1 § 1.) ReMax Elite was originally registered by a principal broker,
Dale Quinlan, on December 28, 2004. (R. 6904, 6922.) Quinlan owned the dba
ReMax Elite from the time he registered it in 2004 until it expired in January 2008.
(R. 1702-03, 8044.) Normally, there would be nothing particularly noteworthy
about a principal broker utilizing a dba.

Here, however, Quinlan ceased

functioning as a principal broker in late 2005. (R. 7305, 7353.) Skip Wing came
in as a successor principal broker for the group of individuals and entities that
comprised his brokerage. Id. Significantly, however, Wing was never assigned
any interest in the ReMax Elite dba, which Quinlan continued to own. See pp. 1112, supra.
Thus, at the time of the transaction concerning Schvaneveldt (both the
execution of the FSBO and the REPC), Skip Wing was functioning as a principal
broker - but not for the entity named on the two contracts (ReMax Elite). The only
individual signing the two documents was the agent Tim Shea, who was incapable
of binding the owner of the dba, since he was not acting on behalf of that owner
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(Quinlan) and was not in any event able to act in any capacity on behalf of
Quinlan, who was no longer acting as a principal broker. 10
This disconnect between the ReMax Elite dba and a principal broker is
dispositive. Only a principal broker can contract for and seek a commission under
Section 61-2-18; accordingly, for a dba to do the same, it must be a properly
~

registered dba of a principal broker, as provided in Section 42-2-5, et seq. In short,
the principal broker statute significantly narrows the class of individuals who
might seek a real estate commission. The dba statute narrows that class even
further, in this case, down to one person: Dale Quinlan.
Schvaneveldt raised standing concerns early on in the litigation, putting the
appellees on notice that the dba was not a proper party plaintiff. (E.g., R. 601
(filed June 23, 2008).) The dba's lack of standing later became the gravamen of a
motion for summary judgment. (R. 1702-03.)
There is ample evidence that Wing or the other plaintiffs realized that the

ij

dba under which they were purporting to sue was never registered to Wing, and the
ramifications thereof. Wing filed a declaration stating that, in the spring of 2006,

..;J

Quinlan had approached the other owners of his company, Aspenwood Real Estate
10

There are instances when naming individually the owners of a dba may cure a
defective dba registration. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d
901, 905-06 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner 636 P.2d 1060,
1062 (Utah 1981). That, however, did not occur here. Quinlan was never named as
a party. Even if he had been, it would have cured nothing, when he was not a
principal broker at the time of the transaction.
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Corporation, and had transferred the ReMax Elite dba to Aspenwood. (R. 7495, ,r,r
7-12.) However, after an investigation, the State of Utah determined that the
documents purporting to transfer the dba from Quinlan to Aspenwood were
forgeries, and that ownership of the dba had never been transferred. (R. 7318,
7332-7350, 8146.) The Plaintiffs did not appeal or otherwise challenge the State's
ruling. Record, passim.

I',~"

Viii

In short, no party with standing brought this action. The plaintiff ReMax
Elite dba was owned by Dale Quinlan, who never sued under the contract, and who
is not a party to either the FSBO or the REPC. At the time the claim for a
commission was first made in this action, the dba had expired. While this defect
might have been curable, that never happened. Even joinder of additional parties
(such as Wing) later on did not cure the dba's inability to sue, since (1) the dba was
expired, and (2) none of the added plaintiffs owned the dba anyway.

B-.

The Plaintiffs cannot cure the standing defect or show standing on
appeal because one of the defendants, Still Standing Stables, has
now acquired both the ReMax Elite dba and all rights of its
former owner, Dale Quinlan.

After the verdict was entered in this case, Quinlan assigned all of his interest
and the interest of his dba, ReMax Elite, in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing
Stables. (R. 813 8.) Quinlan also settled with the defendants all disputes regarding
the FSBO, both personally and on behalf of the dba that he owned when the
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contracts at issue were signed.

(R. 8126, 8142.) Additionally, in 2014, Still

Standing Stables registered the available ReMax Elite dba. (R. 8199, p. 3 ,r B.)
Through these events, Still Standing Stables now is the only entity with the
standing to pursue ReMax Elite's commission claim against itself and
Schvaneveldt. This Court has recognized that such an assignment, and, a fortiori,
~

disposition of a cause of action, can occur.

Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond

Holdings, 2013 UT App 32,296 P.3d 780. Such a transfer of rights "cuts off the
former plaintiffs right to pursue" judgment. Id.,

,r 22.

With the registration of the

ReMax Elite dba, and assignment of the former owner's rights and other choses in
action, Still Standing Stables now has the right to cut off permanently any further
proceedings relating to the judgment. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs lack standing to
maintain this action against the Defendants.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING FROM THE JURY THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER A COMMISSION HAD BEEN EARNED.

A.

The Plaintiffs were required to show seller default under the
FSBO.

As noted, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing
entitlement to a commission as a matter of law. (R. 1508 (motion to have court
rule that "ReMax Elite performed its duties pursuant to the For Sale By Owner
Commission Agreement & Agency Disclosure such that ReMax Elite should be
paid a commission.").)
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The Plaintiffs argued that this case was governed by Fairbourn Commercial,
r,

Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 P.3d 292, and

Schvaneveldt agrees.

In Fairbourn, the Utah Supreme Court applied some

governing legal principles. First, as a general or default principle, "a real estate
broker is entitled to its commission when it has procured a buyer who is 'ready,
willing and able and who is accepted by the seller."' 2004 UT 54, ,r 7. Under this
standard, the underlying real estate transaction need not be consummated because
"absent a contractual provision conditioning a broker's commission on a buyer's
performance, 'the broker is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of the
contract."' Id.
"The default ready, willing, and able rule may, however, by avoided by
agreement." 2004 UT 54,

,r

8. In Fairbourn, the parties had done so, using

language that eliminated any requirement that the specified buyer actually be able
to purchase the property, and instead allowing a commission if any offer was
"procure[d]" from the buyer. Id., ,r,r 8-9. 11
In light of the parties' wording choice, Fairbourn concluded, a statement
later in the contract that the commission was "due and payable upon closing" could

11

The comm1ss1on agreement in F airbourn read, "If F airboum procures, or
presents an offer to purchase said property from Rochelle, at the price and upon the
terms and conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms
or conditions acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per
lot." Id., ,r 8 (court's ellipse and brackets omitted).
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not have been intended to impose a condition that the sale actually close. To read
it otherwise would negate the parties' modified language requiring only that the
broker "procure or present an offer from Rochelle". 2004 UT 54,

,r 11.

The due

and payable provision in that contract was required to be read "in relation to all of
the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id., ,r 10.
In this case, ReMax initially argued that it was entitled to a commission
regardless of whether the sale fell through due to a default of Buyers or a default of
Seller. Thus, the Plaintiffs said, the court need not decide, whether Seller had
defaulted. See R. 1520-1522 ("Default by the Seller or Buyer is irrelevant to
earning the commission.... Any fault or blame for the eventual failure to close is
irrelevant to whether ReMax brought a ready, willing, and able buyer to the table ..
. . Any subsequent problems with the closing and sale are irrelevant regardless of
fault.... While ReMax would contend that the Seller breached, and therefore the
commission is due and owing, such an argument is really irrelevant to deciding
~

whether the commission is due and payable because the closing date has passed,
and according to the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Fairbourn, that is all that is
necessary.").
By the time their motion was argued, the Plaintiffs had refined their earlier
argument, and were now acknowledging that, under Fairbourn, the court needed to
find a default of the seller.

The Plaintiffs argued (correctly) that, under the
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wording of the FSBO itself, the correct standard was not a general "ready, willing,
able, and accepted" standard, but rather seller default:
[Schvaneveldt's trial counsel] is trying to argue that Fairbourn stands
for the proposition that we have to find a ready, willing and able buyer, that
the seller accepts and I disagree, respectfully, your Honor.
I think that the F airbourn case stands for the proposition that, you
know, they're citing the general rule and then saying, here's why the general
rule doesn't apply and that's how Fairbourn applies to this case. And so,
you know, in looking at Fairbourn, what we think the Court can do is say, I
don't even have to think about ready, willing and able, all I have to do is
look at this document and say, did they find a buyer that the seller accepted
and did they default? And if that's the conclusion that the Court comes to,
then the Court can say there's a commission due and payable by somebody,
we don't - the Court still has to rule on that as a matter of law, but
somebody owes a commission.
(R. 8382, p. 53.)
The Plaintiffs' interpretation of Fairbourn was correct, and is dispositive not
only of this appeal but of all claims against Schvaneveldt as a matter of law.
Under the plain language of the FSBO, because the sale did not go through (and
therefore there were no proceeds of the seller from which to pay a commission and
no recordation of closing documents), Plaintiffs could claim a commission only if
the sale was "prevented due to default of seller." But the trial court ruled as a
matter of law - and the Plaintiffs did not appeal - that it was Buyers who defaulted,
not the seller.
As Fairbourn directs, whether a commission was payable starts with the
wording of the FSBO.

Unlike the agreement in Fairbourn, the FSBO here
42

expressly included language contemplating that a sale would have to be completed
for a commission to be payable. The relevant language states:
2.
BROKERAGE FEE. The Seller agrees to pay the Company,
irrespective of agency relationship(s), s compensation for services, a
Brokerage Fee in the amount of$_ _ or 3% of the acquisition price of the
Property, if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns
(the "Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or
exchange the Property. The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be
due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date of recording of
closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is
prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately be
due and payable to the Company.
(Add.Exh. 5, § 2.)
Within the Brokerage Fee provision itself, ReMax Elite agreed that its
payment would be from "the proceeds of the seller." If there were no proceeds- if
the sale fell through - then no payment was due and payable. Similarly, if there
was no "recording of closing documents for the purchase ... by the Buyer or anyone
acting on the Buyer's behalf," then no payment was due and payable.
The parties agreed to one exception to this provision:

"If the

sale or

exchange is prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately

be due and payable to the Company." Under this language, if the Plaintiffs could
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show that 1) the Seller defaulted, and 2) the sale was prevented because of this
default, then it could seek a commission. 12
B.

There was no basis upon which the trial court could find "default
of the seller" as a matter of law.

Although the Plaintiffs did not address seller default in their moving papers,
a number of the parties' motions overlapped, incorporated each other, or were
argued simultaneously. The Plaintiffs might therefore contend that one of the trial
court's rulings on another motion amounted to a finding of seller default. In
response to a motion for summary judgment filed by Tim Shea, the agent, against
Still Standing Stables, the trial court found as a matter of law that the sale fell
through because the seller could not guarantee "insurable" access. The trial court
later stated that this ruling was law of the case as to all parties. See p. 28, supra. 13

12

The Plaintiffs' moving papers did not attempt to establish seller default.
Summary judgment was thus inappropriate on the face of the Plaintiffs' motion.
See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 10, 177 P.3d 600 (moving party must make
initial showing that he is entitled to judgment and that there is no genuine issue of
material fact that would preclude summary judgment in his favor); Frisbee v. K &
K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment is inappropriate if
moving papers fail to establish the absence of fact issues; summary judgment
reversed where document relied on by moving party showed ambiguity on its face
even though non-moving party failed to respond).
13
The court did not rule that there was no access to the property. The court held
that, regardless of potential issues of fact as to access, "this case has never been
about whether access actually existed; rather it is about Still Standing's undisputed
inability to obtain insurance on an access to the property." (R. 5049-50 (emphasis
in original).)
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For two independent reasons, this ruling did not - and could not - establish
"default of the Seller" as a matter of law. First, as the court later ruled, Buyers had
waived any objections to the access issue, and had assented to purchase the
4i>

property in its present condition. See pp. 27 and 28, supra. Therefore, as a matter
of law, it was Buyers who defaulted when they failed to show up at the closing.
The trial court certainly could not rule otherwise as a matter of law. See
Cooper Enterprises v. Brighton Title Co., LLC, 2010 UT App 135, ,r 16, 233 P.3d

548 (buyer was not entitled to return of earnest money where it knew of questions
regarding owner's title before the due diligence deadline but did not cancel). That
is particularly true when the FSBO itself - the commission agreement upon which
the Plaintiffs rely - incorporated the Seller's disclosures regarding access, to which
the court found the Buyers had assented.
Additionally, the trial court conflate~ "insurable access" and "good and
marketable title."

Both the FSBO and the REPC require a Seller to transfer

"marketable" or "good and marketable" title. See Add.Exh. 5 (FSBO) § 4 and
Add.Exh. 6 (REPC) § 10.1. Plaintiffs argued, and the trial court accepted, that a
buyer's inability to find insurance that will include guaranteed access means that
the seller failed to deliver "good and marketable title" as a matter of law. That is
not consistent with Utah law.
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Allegedly landlocked property can be and is sold all the time. As Plaintiffs
themselves pointed out, Still Standing Stables had purchased this very land without
a guarantee of access. The Utah Supreme Court has defined "marketable title" as
"one that may be 'freely made the subject of resale' and that can be sold at a 'fair
price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as
security for the loan money."' Booth v. Attorneys ' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., 2001
UT 13, il 33, 20 P.3d 319, quoting Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238,
1243 (Utah 1992).
The trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, a buyer's inability to
obtain insurance that includes access means that the seller breached an obligation
to convey good and marketable title. In fact, this Court has rejected that very
contention. In Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), a buyer
sought rescission of a real estate purchase by arguing, among other things, that
the lack of legal access to the property precluded the Jacksons [sellers] from
conveying marketable title. Furthermore, the Mostrongs [buyers] argue that
their exposure to litigation, in attempting to obtain legal access to the
property, is evidence of the property's unmarketable title. They assert that
the Jacksons failed and refused to cure this breach of contract. In addition,
they claim they were unable to finance the property because it was
"landlocked."
Id. at 577.

Those circumstances did not mean that, as a matter of law, the sellers failed
to offer good and marketable title, this Court held. Id. at 578, citing Sinks v.
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Karleskint, 130 Ill.App.3d 527, 85 Ill.Dec. 807, 810, 474 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1985)
(court noting that access problems do not impair the right to possess property and
that only defects related to title as guaranteed to the purchaser and affecting market
value will render title unmarketable); see 11 Couch on Insurance § l 5959 Access
to Parcel Insured (ability to access parcel of real estate is not technically a defect in
..;;

the title to the property).
"The Mostrongs failed to establish either factually or as a matter of law that
marketable title in this instance necessarily included legal access to the property,"
the court stated. Mostrong, 866 P.2d at 578. Among other things, they adduced no
evidence that the alleged lack of access affected the market value of the property.
Additionally, the seller was entitled to undertake reasonable efforts to cure defects.
Id.14

C.

If the Plaintiffs only had to show that it produced a "ready
willing, able, and accepted" buyer, issues of fact existed on those
elements.

··-.dJ

14

Actual access would, of course, preclude any argument that good and marketable
title could not be conveyed in this case. Accordingly, the fact that the trial court
declined to rule on whether access in fact existed, and instead focused only on
insured access, meant that the court could not rule on "good and marketable title"
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Mostrong, 866 P.2d at 579, citing Brown v. Yacht
Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Idaho App.
1989) ("Insurable title merely means that property is capable of being insured, not
that the title is good or marketable.") and Holmby, Inc. v. Dino, 98 Nev. 358, 647
P.2d 392, 394 (1982) (noting that insurance may be "evidence'" of marketable
title).
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As the Plaintiffs themselves argued, a general "ready, willing, able, and
accepted" standard did not apply in this case. Even under that standard, however,
the trial court could not properly grant summary judgment.
Were the Buyers ready? That is unclear. The Plaintiffs claimed that a hard
money lender had agreed to finance $3,580,000 of the purchase price, and that
another individual named Mark Bosco was providing the remaining $782,500 of
the purchase price. (R. 1516.) But no affidavit or other testimony from Mr. Bosco
was adduced. (R. 1548-49.) Under Orvis, supra, the lack of such affirmative
evidence precluded summary judgment.
Were Buyers able?

Buyers said they were unable to obtain financing

because of a condition (alleged lack of insurable access) that Buyers waived. (R.
1554.) If anything, this establishes that they were not able.
Were Buyers willing? No; they waived all objections yet did not show up.
(See R. 1630 (Buyers unwilling).)

Were Buyers accepted by Seller? That one is a bit more complicated. Shea
admits that, when meeting with Schvaneveldt, he (Shea) represented that this
would be a "cash" transaction. (R. 3268, p. 22.) Schvaneveldt thought that was
why the space next to "loan" was left blank. See p. 19, supra.
Plaintiffs successfully argued, however, that Schvaneveldt could not dispute
acceptance on this ground because a box containing the word "Conventional"
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under New Loan was marked with an X. (R. 3421; seep. 23, supra.) As a matter
of law, it was immaterial that the space for the loan amount was left blank, the
Plaintiffs argued. But there was evidence to the contrary, including the fact that,
after Schvaneveldt signed the original REPC, Shea went back and hand wrote
"TBD" in the blank. Shea himself admitted that, to him, "TBD" could mean either
\IP

cash or a conventional loan. (R. 3274, pp. 149-150:21-1 (TBD meant "We put
conventional but they had the right to determine whether it was cash,
conventional.").)
Plaintiffs argued, and the court ruled:, that Shea's alterations were
meaningless, that Shea just made them for "internal" purposes. (R. 8384, p. 72:914.) There was no difference at all between a blank space and TBD, Plaintiffs
said; TBD was "equivalent to" a blank space. (R. 3436.)
That suggestion seems perplexing on its face. If TBD literally made no
difference at all, and was exactly the same as a blank space, then why did Shea add

~

it? If a blank space could only mean one thing (non-cash transaction), then why go
back and state that the amount of the loan was To Be Determined? What was there
that needed to be determined?
Whether a transaction is cash or financed is material, particularly given the
greater restrictive lending practices that may come into play with a financed
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purchase. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in ruling as a
matter of law that Buyers were "accepted" by Schvaneveldt. 15
In sum, issues of fact existed as to whether the Plaintiffs produced a buyer
who was ready, willing, able, and accepted by the seller, and summary judgment
was inappropriate.

Ill.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT ANY LIABILITY OF SCHVANEVELDT WAS IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY.
A.

The facts and law show that Schvaneveldt was acting as a member
of the LLC.

By statute and Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial court erred in ruling
as a matter of law that any liability of Schvaneveldt for the commission was in his
personal capacity. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act provides that
no member of a limited liability company is personally liable for an obligation of
the company. Utah Code § 48-2c-601 ("[N]o organizer, member, manager, or
employee of a company is personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a
court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company or
for the acts or omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member,
manager, or employee of the company.").

15

The fact that Shea's other modifications were unmistakably material - for
example, identifying himself for the first time as an agent for the Seller as well as
the Buyer - suggests materiality to this change as well. See p. 18, supra.
50

Applying this clear statute, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an
individual member of an LLC is "personally liable for a signed contract only if he
executed the contract 'in a manner clearly indicating that the liability was his
alone."' Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,

,r 40, 190 P.3d 1269 (quotation omitted).

In Daines, the court held that a signing party was not liable in his individual
~

capacity because the language of the contract and surrounding circumstances
evidenced that he was executing the contract on behalf of the LLC rather than in a
personal capacity, and the contract did not "clearly indicate" the liability was an
individual one of the signor. Id.
For example, the contract in Daines included the name of the LLC, and
prefatory documents executed in relation to the contract made it "apparent that
Daines recognized that he would be dealing with [the LLC] ASC through Vincent
and not with Vincent in his individual capacity." Id. at ,r 41. The conclusion that
the signor was acting in his capacity as a member of the LLC rather than

..;J

individually was also supported by the other side's deposition testimony wherein
he testified to "his continued understanding that Vincent was acting on behalf of
ASC[.]" Id; see also, Krogh v. Nielsen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175087, 9 (D.
Utah Dec. 10, 2012) (dismissing claims against individual corporate officers
because "a corporate officer[] is not personally liable under contract unless 'he
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executed the contract in a manner clearly indicating that the liability was his
alone."').
The same is true in this case. It was Shea - Buyers' own agent - who
identified "Land LLC Still Standing Stables" when defining the Property in the
initial offer. (Add.Exh. 6 at tjf 1). Two days after the offer was accepted, Shea
filled out a Seller's Disclosure form that identified the property owner as Still
Standing Stables, LLC. (R. 2952.) The REPC stated, "If... Seller is a corporation,
partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or othe~ entity, the person
executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to
bind ... Seller." (Add.Exh. 6 at~ 13). And under the LLC act, "any member in a
member-managed company, ... may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property." Utah
Code § 48-2c-802.
Other evidence abounds in the record that Schvaneveldt was acting on behalf
of the LLC - and that everyone knew it.

When ReMax Elite filed the initial

interpleader action to resolve entitlement to the earnest money deposit, it sued only
Still Standing Stables, not Schvaneveldt. (R. l.) Documents filed by Plaintiffs
themselves included records showing that title insurers only searched for liens and
judgments against Still Standing Stables, not Schvaneveldt individually (R. 2977,
2996), that Buyers directed correspondence to "Still Standing Stables, Attn: Chuck
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Schvaneveldt" (R. 393), and that Skip Wing directed correspondence to "Chuck
Schvaneveldt, Still Standing Stables," at its Directors Row address that is also
listed on the REPC. (R. 21; Add.Exh. 6.)
Additionally, if, as Schvaneveldt testified - and, frankly, seems obvious
from the face of the document - another word ("Member") originally followed his
\.@

signature on the REPC, that is further evidence of representative capacity. Even
absent such testimony, however, the Plaintiffs did not adduce "clear" evidence that
Schvaneveldt was signing in his personal capacity. The trial court erred in denying
Schvaneveldt' s motion for summary judgment on this ground. 16

B.

Alternatively, Schvaneveldt's tort claims against Shea and Wing
should be reinstated.

As argued above, Schvaneveldt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If
the Court does not so rule, however, then Schvaneveldt's tort claims against Shea
and Wing should be reinstated on remand.

The trial court declined to allow

Schvaneveldt to pursue negligence or misrepresentation claims against Shea and
Wing because it had ruled as a matter of law that the sale fell through due to a lack
of insurable access. See p. 28, supra. In light of the court's later ruling that this

16

The Plaintiffs complained that, after the denial of his motion for summary
judgment based on the lack of personal liability, Schvaneveldt then asserted an
alternative argument, i.e., that he lacked authority to bind the LLC and therefore
closure of the sale was an impossibility. But parties are allowed to argue in the
alternative, and particularly when their initial (correct) argument has been
successfully opposed.
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access issue had been waived by Buyers (seep. 27, supra), that ruling is no longer
supportable.
Claims against Shea and Wing should also be allowed because their alleged
breaches of duty caused Schvaneveldt concrete harm, not the least of which was
getting Schvaneveldt sued. Although Shea contended that his principal duties were
owed to Buyers, he undisputedly owed some duties to Seller, for whom he also
claimed to be acting. Seep. 18 supra; Cooper Enter. PC v. Brighton Title Co.,

LLC, 2010 UT App 135,

,r 12 n.5, 233

P.3d 548; Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley

Corp, 2010 UT App. 361, ,r 23, 246 P.3d 131. That is especially true when Shea
undertook affirmative actions upon which Schvaneveldt relied to his detriment, at
which point he was required to perform those acts in a non-negligent manner.

Robinson v. Mt. Logan Clinic, 2008 UT 21, 182 P.3d 333. As the alleged principal
broker, Skip Wing is vicariously liable for Shea's actions.
The record supports several examples of actionable conduct. For example,
Shea knew that the property was owned by an LLC. See p. 51 supra (Add.Exh. 6
at

,r

1). Yet evidence exists that, at some point before the commencement of

litigation, Shea altered the word "Member" that Schvaneveldt had written beside
his name on the REPC. Seep. 19-20, supra. The inclusion of that word alone
would have prevented these claims against Schvaneveldt individually.
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Shea also admits that he (mis)represented to Schvaneveldt that this was a
cash transaction, and then drafted an ambiguous REPC that did not contradict that
representation. See p. 19, supra. Because of those actions, Schvaneveldt signed
the REPC - which, again, got him sued. Shea prepared the Seller's disclosures that
the Plaintiffs in this case later claimed were incorrect and had caused the sale to
viJ

fall through.

Schvaneveldt' s recoverable damages include the attorney fees

incurred in defending the claims against himself caused by .Shea's acts.

See

Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 535 (Utah 1993) (recognizing

third party tort rule).
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

The FSBO has an attorney fee provision (the same provision cited by the
Plaintiffs when they received an award of attorney (ees against Schvaneveldt).
Add.Exh. 5 § 8. As noted above, Plaintiffs failed to adduce clear evidence that
Schvaneveldt signed in his personal capacity; accordingly, this Court should
remand with instructions to enter judgment for Schvaneveldt. In that event, or if
the Court remands for other purposes, it should provide that, should Schvaneveldt
prevail on remand, he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Schvaneveldt respectfully
requests that the Court reverse the judgment and instruct the trial court to enter
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judgment in favor of Schvaneveldt as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Court
should reverse the judgment and remand the case for trial.
INCORPORATION

Pursuant to U .R.A.P. 24{i), Schvaneveldt adopts by reference arguments by
Still Standing Stables, LLC (which has not yet been filed) which also relate to the
liability of Schvaneveldt and coextensive claims.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2015.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Karra J. Porter
Phillip E. Lowry
Attorneys for Defendant I Appellant
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1

lifted, the lis pendens, the land sold virtually immediately

2

thereafter-WALLACE :

3

MR.

4

MR. FULLER:

That was all settled---immediately thereafter, about--about

5

90 days, they were able to sell that exact piece of land for

6

the million dollars.
So that's all, your Honor.

7
8

me get all those points in.
THE COURT:

9

You're welcome.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your preparation

10
11

Thank you.

and your argument this morning.
The Court finds and rules as follows:

12

The Court

13

grants Remax•s motion for summary judgment and denies Still

14

Standing's cross-motion.
This is how I see this case.

15

These motions can be

16

boiled down to one simple issue, the lack of a guaranteed

17

access to the property.

18

title insurers and attorneys, no one could guarantee the

19

access to the property existed.

20

argue that there was a valid access by way of an easement.

21

While I'm personally doubtful of the legal efficacy of that

22

easement to achieve what you argued, Mr. Fuller, the bottom

23

line is, I think it•s irrelevant because on one could

24

guarantee the access to the buyer.

25

Still standing attempts to

Both the buyer and the seller were well aware of
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1

this fact and the Court finds that there is undisputed--or

2

that it is undisputed that the lack of a guaranteed access was

3

the sole reason for the--that the transaction failed.
I mean, it strains credulity to think that somebody

4

5

would fork over over four million without a general warranty

6

deed or at least some kind of a guarantee under a special

7

warranty deed that there would be an access.
Still Standing argues that if Shea had made certain

8

9

disclosures to it, then it could have prevented the

10

transaction's failure.

It is my judgment, based on what I

11

have read, that that is not accurate.

12

aware of the access problems from the time it purchased the

13

property and had tried many different avenues to guarantee an

14

access to the property, all of which failed.

Still Standing was

Shea's failure to communicate or disclose

15
16

information to Still Standing did not cause the transaction to~

17

fail.

.i

18

·I

i

Still Standing raises many other issues, including

19

agency duties, disclosures and royalties in an attempt to

20

prevent summary judgment.

21

issues that exist, none of these issues is relevant because

22 ·

Still Standing cannot show that they were damaged by anything

23

other than the inability to guarantee an access.

24
25

While there are undoubtedly. factual

Even if Shea and Remax acted improperly in some way
as Still Standing suggests, the simple truth is that the
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1

actions of Shea and Rernax did not cause the transaction to

2

fail; therefore, Still Standing cannot prove that they were

3

damaged in any way by the actions of Shea or Remax.
As a result, even if Shea did not fulfill some duty

4

5

owed to Still Standing or even if Shea made some

6

misrepresentation to Still Standing, all of Still Standing's

7

claims fail because it cannot prove that Shea and Remax caused

8

any damage to Still Standing.

9

Still Standing could not guarantee an access to the property.

10

The transaction failed because

That's the bo"ttom line.
Accordingly, again, the Court grants the--Remax•s

11
12

motion for summary judgment, dismisses Still Standing's

13

affirmative claims.

14
15

~r. Wallace, would you please prepare an appropriate
order consistent with this ruling?

16

17

MR. WALLACE:

I will do so, your Honor.

Thank you

for your time.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. FULLER:

Thank you.
Your Honor, could I--is there a way--

20

that chart I had there, can I fold that up and put it as part

21

of the record?

Is there a way to accommodate the chart?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. FULLER:

24
25

Which one?
Yeah.

My--it'll fold right up, your

Honor, I-THE COURT:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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i
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1

broker and therefore, it's immaterial whether Mr. Wing was--

2

was consulted or involved in this case, so that's it.

3

And we're going to try this issue.

4

I need just a minute to clear my head.

'w
I don't know

5

whether I can grant something here this morning or not.

6

really tempted, but let me finish with this young lady so she

7

can go.

8

(Off the record.)

9

THE COURT:

All right, gentlemen.

I'm

Let me give you a

10

ruling on Remax•s motion for partial summary judgment.

11

Court grants Remax•s motion for partial summary judgment

12

subject to the jury's factual determination as to the offer

13

date contained in the REPC.

14

rules as follows:

:/

The

In doing so, the Court finds and

15

The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact

16

exists regarding whether plaintiff's earned the commission.

17

The FBSO contract provided that, and for the record, that's

18

the for sale by owner contract, provided that seller would owe

19

Remax a three percent commission, and I'm quoting, if the

20

seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and/or assigns or

21

anyone acting on behalf--acting on the buyer's behalf to

22

purchase the exchange--or exchange the property, end of quote.

23

It is undisputed that seller did accept an offer from Emmett

24

Warren LC; therefore, Remax earned the three percent

25

commission.
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1

The failure of the buyer to close or actually

2

purchase the property is irrelevant to the commission.

Given

3

the language of the contract as well as case law regarding the

4

requirement to produce a ready, willing and able buyer.

5

is no genuine issue of fact that Remax presented a ready,

6

willing and able buyer.

There

I

I

·,J}

·,I
;

7

i

~

The Court has previously ruled that the transaction

8

failed because the defendants--because of the defendants•

9

inability to insure access to the property, not for a lack of

10
11

funding or any other reason.
Under Fairbourne, the commission became due and

12

payable on the date of closing, regardless of the failure of

13

the parties to actually close.

14

the REPC after the parties signed it are a red herring, in the

15

Court's judgment and are irrelevant to the commission claim.

16

What is relevant is that the parties agreed to the terms and

17

signed the REPC, which triggered the obligation to pay a

18

commission.

~l

19

on the buyer and seller's decision to enter into the REPC.

i

20

.,i
t

i

!

~
i

i

The changes Tim Shea made to

J

Any changes made after the fact had no influence

I

I

{;

i

21

t

22

1
f

23

'

24

I

25

And that is something I, where you and I just differ~
on this issue, Mr. Fuller.
Allegations of fraud by Tim Shea are equally
irrelevant to the commission claim.
Additionally, defendants have not pled a fraud claim

J

·vi)

and therefore, any claims of fraud have been waived.
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1

Court will now allow any allegations of fraud to be presented;~
I

2

at trial as such allegations would only distract and confuse

3

the jury from the issues at hand.

5

property as contained in the REPC lapsed because it states

6

that the offer expires January 23rd, 2006, and the REPC was

7

not signed until February 7, 2006.

8

this is a mutual mistake of the parties, out of an abundance

9

of caution, the Court will allow this factual issue to go to

While the Court believes

the jury.
Whether Cathy Code acted personally or as an agent

11

12

of Chuck Schvaneveldt in signing the FBSO agreement is an

13

issue of fact that is not properly before the Court at this

14

time; therefore, the issue must be decided by the jury at

15

trial.

!/

~

Defendants contend that the offer to buy the

4

10

~

With regard to defendants' arguments on Remax being~'

16
17

defunct d/b/a impressions of who the principal broker is, the

18

Court has already addressed those issues in prior rulings and

19

will not address them presently.

1
~

·1

1

20

Now, with respect to the defendants' motion for

21

summary judgment on the issue of--of the Still Standing's

22

liability, this motion is born out of the defendants' attempt~

23

to argue both sides of an issue, specifically attempts by

24

Still Standing to lay blame on the other defendant and vice

25

versa.

'

Defendants cannot have it both ways, but neither can
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1

plaintiffs; therefore, the court is not going to grant summary

2

judgment against plaintiff based solely on Mr. Duncan's

3

argument made in a prior brief and no other facts.

4

Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion as to

5

Still Standing's liability.

6

issue for the jury to decide.

7

Still Standing's liability is an

Let me just indicate with respect to any possible

8

time that the Court would have.

I am not holding a law and

9

motion on Thursday between now and the 9th of August.

I am

10

holding a civil law and motion calendar on the 23rd of July

11

and the 3rd of July, but my vacation schedule is such that I

12

will have no time to read anything like this, that I'm--I'm

13

virtually, for the next two weeks working or on vacation

14

throughout the week except just on those Mondays and I can't

15

come in off vacation and handle stuff like this.

16

can't do it.

17

You know, I

And there are some judges that may want to just sit

18

and listen and shoot from the hip, but I'm just not capable of

19

doing that.

20

I think the issue of liability is just going to have to be

21

decided by a jury.

And I've never done it and I won't start now.

22

MR. FULLER:

23

THE COURT:

So

Okay.

But this issue on whether the commission

,
1

24

is earned is done and you can--I can allow you, Mr. Fuller, to

25

explore the factual issues of whether this was a mutual
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1

mistake or whether the agreement lapsed and you can go into

2

that issue, but I 1 m not going to allow any other--I'm going to

3

uphold that--that commission agreement.

4

commission was earned.
MR. FULLER:

5

I

6

THE COURT:

8

MR. FULLER:

10

So the

Sure.
We're on track for a trial here.

so as far as liability, I don't go back and argue that through
his acts that he--all that liability stuff is done.
THE COURT:

11

No.

There--the issue of whose liability

12

it is for that commission, that--that is an open issue for

13

trial.

14

MR. FULLER:

15

THE COURT:

16

I

So the commission--okay.

commission's earned, so just to--to clarify.

7

9

Okay.

I think the

Okay.
In other words, that can be Cathy Code,

Chuck Schvaneveldt or Still Standing's liability.

17

MR. FULLER:

18

THE COURT:

1~

Yes.
That issue's open and the--and the

19

interpretation of the agreements and you know, I guess the

20

issues of statutes of frauds, those--all those arguments--

21

MR. FULLER:

22

THE COURT:

23

--in my perspective, all apply to

liability.
MR. FULLER:

24

25

Yeah.

Okay.

So would the jury, for example,

be asked--we're not going to ask is a commission due,
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1

the judge has that there's a commission due.
THE COURT:

2

J .I

And what--what I anticipate will be done

3

is.that there will be a jury instruction to the jury that,

4

that as a matter of law, the Court has ruled that the

5

commission was earned.

6

MR. FULLER:

7

THE COURT:

8

Okay.
And the issue before the jury is who

will pay it.
MR. FULLER:

9

Okay.

That makes sense.

Now, and your Honor, you talked about this--the deal

10
i

;•

11

about the lapsed--the lapse.

12

was--

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FULLER:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LeBARON:

18

MR. FULLER:

20

And I appreciate that.

Yeah
That is a defense.

If the agreement

lapsed, then there is no commission earned.

17

19

Yeah.

If it's a question a fact, it

Understand, your Honor.
And we're saying it's either lapsed--we

can't say it's lapsed as a matter of law, we're saying-THE COURT:

No.

I--as I tried to explore with Mr.

21

LeBaron this morning, I--I think that is so fact sensitive

22

that I think it would be an error on the Court's part to--I

:..

I!

i

J
i

23

mean, I read the arguments of why it appear to be a mutual

24

mistake and I thought it sounded reasonable to me, but I think

25

that•s fact sensitive and I'm not--I don't want to create an
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i
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I
. i
•

1

error, so I'm going to be very conservative on that issue--

2

MR. FULLER:

3

THE COURT:

Yeah.
--and so--and I'll let you decide how

4

you want to fashion your jury instruction, but essentially,

5

I'm ruling that--that the commission was earned if in fact,

6

the agreement had not lapsed.

7

MR. FULLER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LeBARON:

Okay.

If agreement is not--has not--

1

10

\

,I

That's-Or can otherwise be directed, I

suppose.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LeBARON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FULLER;

Yes.

By mutual mistake.
By mutual mistake.
But the case where it says you can't

15

ratify it, wouldn't that be a matter of law, where we'd say

16

the Court says you can't ratify it.

17

jury that says did they--did they ratify it through mutual

18

mistake?

Are we going to ask the

l

., ~.
r

i,

'I

Ii
i
1

;.
l

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. FULLER:

Okay.

Okay.

With the two issues on

21

those issues, because that's really the meat of it, the

22

liability part, can the--if the parties stipulated or I got a

23

funny feeling you're going to reverse your earlier decision

24

about the right-of-way and any of the negligence claims.

25

those--with--

.... - - • - - - ~ · - -

; ,

Yes.
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'{
i

Yeah.

I--that decision, again, I 1 m not

going to re-plow the ground.

3

MR. FULLER:

4

THE COURT:

Yeah.
I think I have ruled that that's what

5

caused this sale to not close--

6

MR. FULLER:

7

THE COURT:

8
9

v)

THE COURT:

Yeah.
--was the absence of a--an insurable

right-of-way.
MR. FULLER:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. LeBARON:

12

THE COURT:

Yes.
And--and that it-There's no damage.
And so that's done.

And so, as you

'I

.\

'

13

talk, you know, prepare your--your questions and your

14

arguments, it is a--a settled issue that property didn't,

15

although there was a con--a commission owed, the contract

16

didn't close because there was no insurable interest, but that~

17

didn't affect the entitlement of the agent 1 s entitlement or--

18

and the broker 1 s entitlement to the commission.

19

.
r'

I-;
!

MR. FULLER:

Okay.

And your Honor, so,

20

hypothetically, if the Court grants--Mr. Wallace says we want

21

to make that final and we have this--the real meat of it here,

22

the liability, is there a--is there any circumstance--

23

i

1~

THE COURT:

Let me just tell you that I've looked at

!

24
~

25

some of these others and I haven't had time to-MR. FULLER:

Okay.

I

I
i

t

;'
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA I
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REMAX ELITE, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,
·vi)

SECOND

OISTRlr:-r ~OURT
RULINGS AND ORDER
ON PENDING MOTIONS

vs.
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et
al.,

CaseNo.060906802
Judge Michael D. Lyon

JUL 17 2012

Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs ("Remax") filed a motion for rule 54(b) certification. In response,
Defendants ("Still Standing'1 filed a motion to enter rule 52 findings and a motion to
reconsider. Remax then filed a motion to dismiss Still Standing's third-party complaint,
and Still Standing countered by filing a motion to amend its counterclaims. The Court

addresses each motion in turn.

I.

Remax's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification
Pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Remme asks the Court

to certify as a final judgment its summary judgment ruling dismissing Still Standing's
claims. While the Court initially intended to grant the motion and expressed this
intention to the parties at oral argwnent on July 12, 2012, after further consideration, the
Court denies the motion.
Rule 54(b) provides that "the court may direct the entry of a final judgment" on a
claim "upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." Utah R. Civ.

504?

,,.

.

-~
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P. 54(b). Upon review, the Court cannot make such a determination in this case.
Following the Court's ruling on Remax's motion for partial summary judgment, there are
very few issues left to be resolved in the case. Trial on the remaining issues is set to
begin in less than three weeks. To enter final judgment on some claims now would only

separate the claims while moving up the appeal deadline by less than a month. This
seems like a needless measure that could also prejudice Still Standing, as it would then be
required to file an appeal around the same time it is preparing for trial. At this point, the
more prudent course is to wait the additional month when all claims will be resolved.
Consequently, the Court denies Remax's rule 54(b) motion.

II.

Still Standing's Motion to Enter Rule 52 Findings
On March 22, 2012, the Court heard oral arguments on Remax's motion for

summary judgment on Still Standing's affirmative claims, and Still Standing's cross-

motion for summary judgment on those claims. At the conclusion of the arguments, the
Court granted Remax's motion and denied Still Standing's motion, stating the Court's
findings and conclusions in support of those rulings. Counsel for Remmc prepared an
order based on the Court's oral ruling, and the Court signed and entered it on May 22,
2012. Still Standing now asks the Court to enter a written statement of the grounds
supporting its decision. The Court denies the motion.
Still Standing quotes from Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277, 34

P .3d 234, in support of its motion. In that opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded a ruling that had granted summary judgment base on "the reasons set forth
in the City's supporting memorandwn," but did not otherwise explain the reasoning
behind its decision. Id. at ,r 9. The appeals court held that it was "unable to square the
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trial court's ruling with the various arguments asserted in the City's motion." Id. at 110.
Based on Gabriel, Still Standing asserts that an additional statement from the Court is
required.
The present case is distinguishable from Gabriel. In Gabriel, the trial court gave
no explanation for its reasoning other than the reference to the City's memorandum. In
our case, although the written order is rather laconic, it does refer to the oral findings and
conclusions the Court made at the close of oral arguments in which the Court made very
clear the grounds for granting Remruc's motion and denying Still Standing's. The Court
stated that its ruling was based on the undisputed fact that the transaction failed because
Still Standing was unable to guarantee access to the property. The Court further stated
that while many factual issues existed, none of those were relevant because Still Standing
could not show it was damaged by anything other than the lack of insured access.
Consequently, the Court held that Still Standing was not damaged by the actions of
Remax or Tim Shea.
As the written order refers to the unambiguous explanation contained in the

Court's oral findings and conclusions, the Court sees no need to alter the written order.
Accordingly, the Court denies Still Standing's motion.

m.

Still Standing's Motion to Reconsider
Still Standing asks the Court to reconsider its ruling granting summary judgment

for Remme on Still Standing's affirmative claims. However, Still Standing does not
present any new evidence or arguments to support its motion, but rather reasserts that
access is a question of fact and that Tim Shea's actions were obviously negligent. Even
if both of those assertions are true, this case has never been about whether access actually

5049
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existed; rather it is about Still Standing's undisputed inability to obtain insurance on an
access to the property. By all accounts, the transaction failed because Still Standing
could not guarantee access to the property, and thus provide marketable title. Therefore,
the actual existence or non-existence of an access is irrelevant. Furthermore, as the Court
already ruled, Tim Shea's alleged negligence is also irrelevant because Still Standing
could not show damages resulting from anything other than the inability to insure an
access.
The Court denies the motion to reconsider.

IV.

Remax's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint

Remmc moves to dismiss Still Standing's second third-party complaint. The
Court grants the motion.
While Remax' s motion for summary judgment on the affinnative claims of Still
Standing was still pending, Still Standing filed its second third-party complaint in
response to Remax's amended pleading. Remax moves to dismiss the claims under the
law-of-the-case doctrine because they are essentially identical to the ones the Court
dimissed when it granted Rema,c' s motion for summary judgment.
The law-of-the-case doctrine "provides that a decision on an issue at one stage of

a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation." Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734, 739 (Utah 1990). Still Standing first argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine should

not apply because the second pleading adds new third-party plaintiffs, Chuck
Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code. This argument is without merit. As sellers in the same

position as Still Standing, the deficiencies that doomed the claims of Still Standing, i.e.,
the inability to guarantee access as the sole reason the transaction failed, also condemn
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the same claims when brought by Schvaneveldt and Code. Consequently, the addition of

new parties does not save or resurrect the claims that the Court has already dismissed.
Still Standing further argues that these claims should fall wider one of the
exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine, claiming that they are based on new evidence
and that the prior decision was clearly erroneous. As Remme displays in its reply,
however, the claims are not based on any new evidence. The facts show that the
documents in Remmc's file were made available to Still Standing over four years ago.
Thus, the new evidence exception is unavailing. Additionally, as the Court has already
ruled above that it will not reconsider its decision to grant the motion for summary
judgment that dismissed the claims, the Court is obviously not convinced that its prior
decision was clearly erroneous.
Consequently, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, Still Standing's second thirdparty complaint must be dismissed because the Court previously dismissed those claims
when it granted Rema}{' s motion for summary judgment. The Court grants Remax' s
motion to dismiss.

V.

Still Standing,s Motion to Amend
Still Standing requests in the alternative to its opposition to the motion to dismiss

that the Court allow amendment of its pleadings. As the Court has already dismissed the
claims that Still Standing seeks to add by amendment, and trial is less than three weeks
away, the Court determines that amendment is not in the interests of justice.
Accordingly, the Court denies Still Standing's motion to amend.
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In summary, the Court denies Still Standing's motion to enter rule 52 findings,
motion to reconsider, and motion to amend. The Court also denies Remmc's rule 54(b)
motion to certify. The Court grants Remax's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.
Titls ruling constitutes the order of the Court. No further order under rule 7(f)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary.
Dated this

J:/-

day of July, 2012.
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·1

1

seller's disclosures, provided two days after the REPC was

2

signed, revealed that there was an issue with the access.

3

this is significant and Mr. Duncan mentioned it and while I

4

got a glimpse of it this morning, I'd.never had a chance to

5

fully absorb this, but I think it's a very good observation

6

and it's this:

7

buyer, not Tim Shea, to perform its due diligence and

8

investigation the access, to see whether he wanted to proceed

9

with the purchase.

t

,r

··-

1.

.
,·.

\J

At that point, however, the onus was on the

The REPC provided for a due diligence

10

period which the buyer could back out of if it--if he had

11

issues--if he had issues with the access, but the buyer did

12

not object during that period.

r·'\

1'1.1

Now, if the buyer had objected during the due

13

.\

And

14

diligence period, defendant would have, in the Court's

15

opinion, a much stronger argument that the plaintiffs are not

16

entitled to a commission.
In failing to object to the access issue during the

17
18

due diligence period, the buyer essentially assented to

19

continue with the sale despite the access issue.

20

that's the natural consequence under the terms of the

21

agreement.

22

broker, buyer and seller all knew all along that there was

23

contingency, which, if not met,... would derail the transaction.·

This is entirely different from Stewart, where the

Where the due diligence period passed without

24

25

I mean,

objection, the contingency here was apparently waived and the

~";;'1''1.,.~.-"'12'1~.:..1.L"?."':J"...,_.:::S.,-.~---.# .-, •·.,,. ·-"\•"
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~-

1

buyer gave up his right to object.

2

Additionally, from that point on, what the seller

3

had to do--had to sell and what the buyer purported to sell

4

were the same, that is a cloud on that access unlike the facts

s

in Stewart.

6

all parties were apparently moving forward to closing in spite

7

of the access issue.

8

inapplicable to this case and the failure of the buyer to

9

object to the access during the due diligence period is

:I
j

.l

between the buyer and the seller.

11

plaintiff's ability to recover a commission.

JI

I
i
iI

.,J

~

It in no way implicates the

Now, the Court is not opining on the merits of the

13

case between buyer and seller, as that is not before the

14

Court, but i~ theory, after the due diligence period, the

15

buyer would not have a right to later back out of the

16

purchase, due only to the access issue.

17

failure to clqse would give rise to a breach of contract claim

18

by the seller against the buyer.

19

result of that action between the buyer and the seller would

20

be for specific performance or alternatively, damages.

1

I

Consequently, the Stewart case is

10

12

••• J,

Here, all parties knew of the acces·s issue and

Consequently, any

If the buyer did breach, the

If the seller were awarded specific performance, it

21
22

would be entirely equitable that the _plaintiff recover their

23

comm_ission and you wouldn't argue with·that.
Additionally, the seller would likely be entitled to

24

25

recover the commission from the buyer, as it was the buyer's

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

Exhibit 5
For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement
& Agency Disclosure (FSBO)

-

.........:i·~-..

........

.~

·••••• ,, .. ,a

""'~

,,.

........ ,-

..,_,

ru~" ~ "-'•.,

...... ..-.., ·~--·· -~·

I!

61"4/Z999 1.0!4-8:44 276.l

,__

FAX NO.

JAH-20-2006 FRI 11:50 AM

.[B

.,.. )

P. 07/08

.}_~.; .'.·

FOR SALE BY OWNER COMMISSJON AGREEMENT & AGENCY DISCLOSURE
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.
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2. BROKERAGE FEE. Ttse Soller as,eos to pay the Company. irrespective of agency relationsh1J>(s). as compensafion
of tt>e acquisition price of thP. P(Operty, ff the
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to purchase or e'Kchange 1he Property. The Setler ag'"'5 that the Brokerage fee shat\ be due and payable_ from the
proceeds of the Seller. on the date o1 reconfil'9 of aosfng document$ for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the
for semt:GS. a Brokerage Fee in the amount of$,_ _ _ _ _ _ or
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Buyer or anyone adlng on the Buyer's behart. ff the sale or exchange is prewtntecf by defaurt aftne Seifer. tt\8 Brokerage
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13. ENTIRE AGReEMENT. This Commission Agreement. Including U\e Seller's Property Cotldll{on Olsdosure form.
contain the entire agreement between the parties relatfng to the subJect matter ot this Commission Agreement. This
Commlssfor, Agreement may not be modified or amended except fn writing signed by the parties h8tato.

;«::7~~~~~:~w_;•~ ~:::::e~~f~oda~:~~:~~of~

iq~.~:and ·carhy Codf'..

•; ; ~ ~ ~ - - , . ·•· ey: ~ndl'OUBl'aillch-Biokl!fl · • Tim Shea

·

M. Scott Quinney

-· ··

,o~YI-OGNTIJ UTAJi 4'SOCI.\TION OF REA.l.rORS&-2000 ltEV.15ED 7.4.04 -'LL RlQHl'& RESERVED
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Real Estate Purchase Contract- Land (REPC)
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REAL=,ES?ATE PIJRCKASE C.ONJ.RACT -- LAND

This I• a 111~1.lillUl!nv cs,ntraf;t. If you dnlre fapl ar b"ic •~le!, eonrriiit your attorney w tax advr.or.

EARNEST MONEY
·.. . RECBPT

Buyer Emmett Warren and pr Assigns offers to purchase the Property described below and hereby delive,s to \he
--Brokerage, as·Eamest Money, the amaunt of $25Jlfm in lhQ form of Ql::f ~CK which, upon Acceptance of tilts offer by an
. partltls (as defined In Soctlon 23), shall be deposited In accordance with statit·law.
·Recetved by: - - - -I
-f
-~
-- - -rocel#lt
--~
- - - on
(lfFa!M
ac:lu1awltd;N
vf Eanwlsl
Monllf)
. --Brokerage: BeLMu EQte { L,aytpn
..

.:

..

.

Branch )

. . ..

. (Dais)

Phone Number: 80:J-825-3700

OFffR TO P_\JRCHASE

....

.

sun

.... :- . ·1. PROPERTY: Land LLQ,
·stan~ing Stables atso described as: paa;e] # 23:;::006-00Qp City of HY~Ue .... : ·.
·· · ._.Cou~of~ Stato of Utah. ZIP B!31Q (lhe "Property1.
·
· .
: ~.1 Included ntm-.,(speclfy) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ - - -

]l----

1.2 Water Rlahta/Water Stuarea. The folJowlng water rtghts and/or water share, are Included ln tht Purcltoae .Price.
Shires of Stock In the _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Name of Water Company)
iXJ othtr (spectfy) Ajf rights attacb@d to h property and or pertafnjng 1° the Prm>trt)!..
,2.-PURCHA&E PRICI: The purchase prtce for tht Property 1s S436250,Q
: The pun:hna prfco will -be paid as fcllaws:
S.25.Q!m (1) Eameet Money Deposit. Under certain conditions deec:rlbed in this Contract THIS

. DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTAUY NON-REFUNDABLE.

·

$,_ _ _ _ _ (b) New ~aan. Buyer 119rues to apply for. one or more of the following loans:

r\

·

[X) CONVENTIONAL [ ] OllfER (spedfy) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ff[ the
roan ls·kl Include any paJ1icUlar
then
check
betbw
details:
JSPECIFI.CLOANTERMS
_ _terms.
__
_
__
_and
_give
__
_ _ _ _ __

$ .

(~) Saller Financing. (no

attached Seller Financing Addemium, If applieable)

s~____ (d)Dther(spaclfy). _ _ _ _ _ _. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $._ _ _ _ _ (a) Balanao of Purchase Price tn Cash at Settlement.
S436250Q PURCHASE PRICE. Total Df fines (a) thraugh (a)

3. SETTLEME!NT AND CLOSING. Settlement iman lake place on the Settlement Deadfine referenced lrt Section 24(c), or
on a date upon which Buyer and Seller agrae tn writing. •satuement• shaU occur only Whun all of the following have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller havo elgned and deftvered to each other or to the escrow/cloelng office all documents
requlrud by lhls Contracrt. by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be
paid by Buyer under thesa documents (except for the procueds or any new loan) have been dellvered by Buyer to Seller
ar ta the escrow/closing office In the form of collected or cleared funds: and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller
under these documents have been delivered ~Y Saller lo Buyer or to the escrow/dosing office In the fonn of collected or
cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half(¼) of tho fee charged by the ncrow/clostr,g office ror Its
servJcos In the aefflemen1/ctoslng process. Taxes and assessmenta for the current year. rents. end Interest on assumed

obtlgatfons shall be prorated at Settlement es set for1h In this Section. Praratlons set forth In this Sectfon shan be made aa
of the Settlement Deadline date referenced In Section 24(c). untess otherwise agreed ta In writing by the parties. Such
wtitfng could Include the settlement etatement. The transaction will be ccntldered closed when Settlement has been
completed. and when an of the foUawlng ha\'e been completed: (I) the proceeds of any new loan have been detivoted by
the Lender to Seaer or to the esc;row/closfng office: and ~Q the appllcabre Clostng documents have 1>een·reoorded In the
office oflho county recorder. The actions described in parts (I) and (II) of the preceding sentence shall ba completed
within four calendar days of 8$tUemenL
.
.

4, POSSESSION, Seller shall dellver physical possession to Buyer wltnln: [X] Upon Closing [ ) Other (spec:ffy)
S, CONFIRMATION OF A~ISCLOSURE. At the signing of tNs conn=:
JSeller's Initials~ e r ' a lnltia_ls
.

l

P$ge 1 of S pagoa

SeU1J(i lnltiufs

C, >

Date

Z- 7~ o(

8uyet's Initials

~

.___,)
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~

Jboth Buyer and ~ell9r_
-· q_ail:.fmlti,cl Agent;
] Bl:IYBt" [ .f&oth Buytr11i\"i~aa1fai' .
as ,I Llmllic;l•AVJ.nt; .

. :Usting Agent - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~presents [ JSeller [ ] Buyer [
·
.
• represents ( J Seflet [

. Listing Broker for
(Company Name)

Tun-Shea, rapresencs f J Seller 1 J Buyer ( l both Buyer and Soller
•
·
as a Lfmltad A9•nti
.
·-BUY,er'I Brokerfgr ·Romax Elite ( Scgtt QpJnne~}· repntsents [ 1senlr [XJ'Buyer l J_both-BuyeraA_d-Self~r·~-~
Btiyer's Agent

·

:

(Company Natne1 ·

• 11 Umttid ~gent:
. ·&. TITLE INSURANCE. At s,tdemont. Seller agrees to pay for a atandard-aav•rage owner's pollcy of ~~e:fn~u~nce . .·
·rnaurtng Suye_t!n tht atnount of the Purcha• Prbl. Any addJtlonaf Ihle Insurance ~rage ahalt be at BU)'et'~:.e~~·
· .
·. 7. SB.LER DISC&.0$URl:S, Na later than the Sellar Dlsclosure.DeadDne referenced In Stction 24(a), Seller sh.aft provide ·
· · to Buyer the ftffloWln" dbtumants·.whfch. are colieattvoly refe,red .to ~s the "Seller 01sclosures":
.. ·- (a) i Seller property 'COridttlon dlsdosuro for the-Property, $igned and dated by Seller; /
· : .....(b) ·a comrnbmentfot the po~ of .fflle Jnsurance;
#

.~(c) a oopy of a~ ,eases ~ng ~ Property not e><plring pl'ictr to Closing;
· ·... (d) WriUon notice of ,ny cfalin& and/or conditfons known tQ S~ffer relati~ to enviranmontal pmbrems:
·· (e) evidence~ any water rights and/or water shares reterem:ed in Section 1.2 above: end
· :(f) 01her (specify)
·
·
.

:· •

.

. .
~

...

·

· · ·

a. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER S DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer't obligation to purchase U!)dor thfs
Contract (Meck 1ppllcs11bf• bazea);
1

(a) [)CJ rs
Section 7:

I ·1 IS NOT conditioned upon B\l)'Gr's epproval ofth~ contuntof all thasetlerDlsclosures referenced In

(b) (X] 18 I Jts NOT cond'rtloned upon Buyer'1 approval of a physical condition Inspection of the Propertyi
(c=) [ J 1$ (X] IS NOT 00ndltkmed upon Buyer's approval ate curveyofthe Property by a ftcensed surveyor;
• (d) {X) 18 [ JIS NOT condition~ upon Buyer's apProval of appllcabfe federal, state and local UQVBfflmental lewa.
ordinances and rugututlons affectfng 1he Property: and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenanls,
~
candltlona and restrfct1ons) aff~ng U,o Property. (e) lX) JS [ ] IS NOT c:ondlttoned upon the Property appraising for not loss than the Purchase. Price;
.
(1) [X] JS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer'a approval of1ho terms and condltfons of any mortgage financing

refertnGed tn Suction 2 above:
.
(g) .(X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned UP.on Buyer• approval of the falloWlng tests end evaluatfcns of the·Property:
(specify)·.
.

SoJITut

.

.

.

rr any of itoma B(a) through 8(9) are checked rn the affl~atlvc. then Sections 8. 1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; alherwito, they
do not apply. The Items checked In the affirmative above aro collecUvely refem,d to as Buyet's -Cue Dillgenc6." Unless
otherwise provided In this Contract. Buyer's Due Dlllgenca shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conductsd by
Individuals or entltfes of 8uyn cno1ce. Seiter agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due DDl9enoe and with a final pre-closing
fnspectlon under Section 11.

a.1. Due Dllfgonco Daadflne. No later than 1he Due Olngance Deadline referenced In Suct10n 24(b) Buyer shalt: (a)
ccmpJeta aD of Buyer's Due DDrgonc&; and (b) detonnlne if the retults of Buyer's Due OD1gen0a aro a=eptab!u to ewer, ·
I.Z Right to Can~J or ObJeGt. If Buyer detennlne, that the resuns of Buyet'a Due DDJ;ence are unacceplabfe, Buyer

may. no later than th• Due Dlllqence Deadllne, either. (a) cancel thl1 Contract by providing written notice to Seifer,

whereupon lh• ~ett Money Depoelt lhan bo- re!easud to Buyer. or Cb) provide Seller with written notice af obJeodans.

S.3 FaUure to Respond. If by the eScplratfon of tho Dua Dtngonce D6adllno. Buyer doas not: (a) cancel .this Contract
as provided 1n sectron 8.2: or (b) deliver a wrktan abJeetlon to Seller regarding the Suyen Due DfUgence, The B.uyer',
Due Dlllgence ahall bo deemed approved by Buyer: and the cohllngencles referenced In Sections 8(a) through 8(g),
lneludlng btA not tlrnJted to, any financing 00ntfnge11cy. shall be deemed waived by Buyur.
·
1,4 Response by 8111,r, If Buyer provld es wrttten objections to Seller, Buyer and SeUe-t 1hall have seven calendar
dB.Y' after Seller's receipt of Buyer'e objection, (the •Responuq Period·) In which Co agree In writing upon tho manmtr of

re$Olvlng 13uyar'a obJacttone. Except a& provided In Sect!on 10.2, Soller may, but shall not be n,qufred to, ""°Iva Buyer's
0J)Joctlon,. If Buyer and sener have not agreed In wrlUng upon the manner of resolvlng Buyer's oblactlone, Buyer may
cancel this Contrect by provldlnQ written notice to Saner no later than threo Galendar cfaY$ 1ner expiration of the Reeponse
Period: whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released 10 Buyer. If this Contract ts nat canceled by Buyer under
Olis SectJon 8.4, Buyer's obJectfon• • hall be deamad walved by Buyer. This waiver shall not affoct those Items wananted
Paga 2 ors poga
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In Sectlon 10.
9. ADDmOHAL TERMS. There [ J ARE [ JARE NOT addenda to this Contract ccntafnfng additional tenns. If~rt are,
_·. :lhtJ terms of the followlng .addenda are lncorp!>1'9ted into this Contract by this reference: [ J Addenda Nola __.·._ __
-( ] Selltr Financing A~dendum [ ] Othar.(spec:ifyJ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND RePRESENTATIONS.
10.1 Condition of Titfe. Soller ropresentt that SeUer has foe title. to the Property and will convey good and marketable
tJUe to Buyer at Clo$1ng by general wananty deed. auyer agrees, however, to accept tltle to lhe Property tubjeat to the
fol1owJno matters of racord: easemonta, dNd restrictions. CC&R's (meaning covenants. conditions and rattrlo\lonu), and
rights-of-way: 1nd sutJJeCt to the conten11 of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8.
Buyer also agrees to take the Property 811bject to uxl&ting leases mfectlng the Property and not expiring prior to Closing.
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes. assessments, homeowners association dues. utilltles, and other services
proVfded to the Property after Clastng, Seller wlH cause to be-paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deedS, Judgment$,
mecharilG'$ riens1 tax llans end warrants. Seller wiO cause to be paid current by Clostng an &1$assmen&1 and homeowners
assoclatlan dues.
IF ANY PORTION OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESE:NTLY ASSESSED AS "GREENBELT" (CHECK APPLICABLE

BOX):

[X] SELLEij .[ JBUYER SHALL BE RESPONSJBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY ROLL-SACK TAXES ASS.ESSEO
AGAINST THE PROPERTY.
1D.2 Candltlon of Ptopeny. Seller warrants that the Property wm be In the foHOWlngcondltlon ON THE DATE
SELLS DBNERS PHYStCAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) the Property ahaD be he of debt1a and personal property;
(b) the P,operty will be In \he same general condition as It was on the date of Acceptance.
11. FINAL PRE-ClOSING INSPECTION. Before Sett1em11nt. B\ly11r rnay. upon reasonable no1[ce and at a reasonable
Ume, cqnduct a final pra•closlng inspection of tha Propurty to determine only that the Property Is •as roprosented,•
meaning that the Pruperty has been repaired/corrected as agruud to ln SecUon B.4, and Is In the condition warranted i!1
Socdon 10.2. If the Property 1$ not as represented, Sellar wm, prior to Settlement. repair/correct the Property, and place
/\

the Property In the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender If appDcable), .esCIOW an amount at
Settlem,nt •ufflqlent to provide far the samo. The failure to c;ondu~ a ftnal pre-closing lnapecUon or to claim that tha
Property la not as rOi)rasented, shaU not can$\ltutB a waJver by Buyer of the right to ruaelvo, on 1he data Df possession, the
Property u 111prasented.

12. CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from Iha deto of Acceptance untll Ul11 dqto of Cosing, none
of 1h11 followlng 811110 occur without the prior written cansent of Buyar: (a) no changes In any existing leases shaP bet madei
{b) no new leases shall ba entered ln1o: (c) no aubstantfal alteratlons or lmpravamenta to the Property •~all be mldo-or
undert1tklm and {d) no furtner financlal enaumbrances affecting thu Prop~,ty &hall be made.

13. AUTHORITY Of SIGNERS. If Buyer or ~bur Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate. Umlted Uabillty company or
other entity, the person exewdng this Contract on Its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and
Sel!er.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with Its addenda, any attached eXhlbfts, and Seller 0lsdoiures,
conat1tuto1 the entire Contract between tho parties end superiedes and replaces any and an prior negoUatJons,
representations, warranties, undar.1tandlngs or contracts between the parties. ThlS Contract cannot be changed e~pt by
written agf""11tnt of the parties.
·
·
1&. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Tho parties agree that any dispute, eufslng prior to or after Closcng, ,vlated to th!$ Contra,;t
(check appllcabla box)
I JSFtALL
.
(XJ MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
fttst bo submitted to medlatfon. tr the parties agree to medlatJon. tha dlsputu shaa be submitted to mediation through a
madfatiOn prowfar mutuaUy auirved upon by the partlBS. Each party agrees ta bear Jts awn costs of mediation. If medfatlon
fail&, the au.er procedures and remedies avatlable Under thla Contract shlllJ apply. Nothing In this SecUon 15 shall prohibit
any party from ••eking erne,geney equliable reRef Siendlng mediation.

-~

1&. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, SeUer may elect either ta retain the Eemest Money Dsposlt at Dquldated damages, or to
return Hand su, Buyer to •pecifioally enforce Ihm Ccntratil or puraue other remudtea avaftabkt at law. If Sonar detaults, ln
addition to return of tha Ea~ Money Deposit. Buyer may olect elth,r to uCQJpt from Sauer a sum •qual to the Eamest
Money Pepoalt as Uquldated damager., or may •ua SeHer to specfficatly enfon:e this Contract ar pursue other remedies
avallable at law, If Buyer eJe_ota to accept liquidated damageai Saller agrees to pay 1he llqutdated damage, to Buyer upon
Paga3 of
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..· ·· 11.-ATTORNEY .f.EfS ANP ~-~TS•.ln the event of UUgation or b1ndlng ~rbitraUon to enforce this Contract. ..the prevafllng · · · . . _- ..
· . ·party_shall 6e enUtled ti>.coitaand reasonable attorney-fees. HoWever. attomeyfeosshan not.be awardedJotpartlcipa11on •.. :· .-· ...- ·:.:
. .
..ln medfatJon und$r Section· 15.
·
·
·

· : · ..·.-18. _NOTICES. Ex~pt as provided ln Sedlon 23, an notices required '1tld_erthls Contract must~be: (a) .In wrttlng; ;(ti)jlgnbii
·. :by the par1y_gMng notice; and .(c) re~lved by the ocher partY or the other party's agent no fat~r than-.tt\e appU¢abr..;,~te
. .-·referenced In this Coptract.

..

:

·

· : .-: · 11•.ABROOATION~.-Except far the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10.2, 15 and 17 and expre$s.warreJ'tles--m•ai:fe Jn·\hia
·. . ·Contract; lt\e provisions of this contract .t1afl not apply after Cloefng.
·
_:20.,JU.SK OF LOSSi All risk ot Jose to the Property, fncludlng phys1cal damage or destruction .to the~Propv'r\tor.ita
.._lmp'ri>Vemonts-duo to any caus~ex~pt ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking 1n em!nent.dcmaln,-shafl be
. ..: .:bomaby Soffer untU the ~ n Is dosed.
. . :· ...21. 1JME IS t)f THE ESSENCE. T1mo ls of the essence regarding 1he dates set fotth in this Contract. extensions must ba · . · ·· ··
· .· :agreed-to In~ by an patties. .Unless-otherwbe explfci11ystated in this Contract: (aJ performance under..eadl Section
af thli-Contract whfch-refenmaes a date shah abactutely t;e.requlred by'5:00 PM Mountain Time on1ha $t&t~..date:-and
·-•: · .'. (b)· the·term •d~ ~Eill_me~n ~lirydar days arid sl111U be aiunt~ct.begf11~ng on the day folkiWing the vvent .whicif~ters
Utellmirn) requfremenf (I.a., ~nee, eta.). Perfarmancelfates!&nd limes ruf~ncerJ:.herafn:st:u1ll-nat beblndlnD:flPqrt · .
. . :title compantes:Jenduri, appralaers-and others not partla to lhfs:C:ontraet. except as otharwlie:aori.!ed.-fo.fn:vnitlng_by ·...
· . ~--·

tuch non-pa,ty.

·

·

··

·

·

•• •

•

·

..... ·..: .'.12,,:FAX TRANSMISSION .AND <:9.UNTERPARTS, facslmJle (flll<) transml$slon of a ei9fla~ copy of thlS ,t:anhc;t, ·any . · ·
. · ·· ..·~: •addenda and counteroff,re.--and'· the .retranemlsslon cf any signed Jax ehaB bathe ~""' as dellvery:of afr;O.ifglrial.:Thls .
. · · .. ·. · · • •
·:· · . ·._Ccih'tr_act and any addehcfa end .counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
_.
. .
· . :~--.

->>:~-·

.. · · . .i3'-ACCEPTANCE, •Aaceptaoa,• occura when Setter or Buyer, responding to an offar 0r counteroffer Of.P. other. (a)
• . · : .-~slgjil '1G offerorcounteroffel:_Whe.rit !I~ to lndfcaie actepian~;.~nd-(b)communicataa totha other~~or-to·tha-othat
·· · ·.- .party's agenttn'at the Offer ar.coUlltdroffer has been elgned es requireii.
·
f\

.· 2_4.-~0NTRACT PE'ADUNJ!S. Buyer and SeUtr agn:e that the following deadltnes shalt apply to.thbl Contra.ot

. . ... ... Ja) ·~- D(odosu~ Dea,:lllna
:· . . . : ·(b) Du1-Dffl&eJtc& Deadline

lf ~ 5 ~ '-'IL1"mW
. "1D l>Ay ~

Atn el¥/{;. f..

· (D•t•)

.•· ·..

. ..
. •.....
•: .... ·.
'

. ...
. ··.·

·....

~ .rJ4tT:rffJ fk~rtYl'¥tS (Date)

...

. ·

..: _.. . ...(c) S.lllament D.eadllne
9o blf.tJ @lo,,
~oat.)
.
. . ..Wg, m:r,, Aa;;me,g
.
·. :: · :..-~lr.OFPl!R.A~D.:TIME 'FOR ACCEPTA~CE. Buyer offars to .s,urcha&e 1he Pmper1y on the above termut,d cofiditiorii,·:ff · · . .. .. . . . . ·

: ·.:: . ~;.Sek d~uat acee'pt thlo ciffer ~ 4:J)Jl I 1AM ,[XJ-PM Mountain Trme on JanyafY 23, 200Q.(Dat•l.-thls otre(ShaU . ·. . ._- . ..-~' ..
· ·· ..-.Jcpse: a d the a.~~ralltJ shall retiJm .1ha Earnest Money .OepoSlt to Buyer.

· .

·

-.'7-a6 ·

·

·

-flik¥~Slgnature)
(Offer Date)
(Buyer'& Signature)
(Otrer Date)
The later of th11 abow Off•r Datoa shall be referred to a tt'le "Orrer Referen~e Datt,•

Emmett Warren and or
AaaJgos

(BuyBTS' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (NOtie@ Addre$S)

Pigo 4 or$ pa~os

SeHer's lnithsll

(Zip Cede)

(Phone)

L . ..

{

"

P. 06
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ACCEPTANCEICOUNTfROFFER/REJ;CTION
CHECK Otre:
..' ·.)~~CEPTAN~E OF OFFER ~0 PURCHASE: Seller ~pts thu .~r'1qlng offergn the terms and condltlans specified .

• t ] COUNTEROFFER: .~ener P~ttn1S for. Buyer's Acceptance- Iha terms.of Buyer's offer subject to the _exceptions .or
.. ..
:
.
.

·· ·. rn:QdJf.tcauons a& specffted In ttte.attaehedA.QDENDUM NO, _ _ __

(D,te)

(TlTnt)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ti/2..DM
(Sellers' Name$) (PLEASe PRINT)

(Sellers Signature)

(Date)

(Tfme)

'SL<: CWIJI" @I" 3.6/, t/-9 2- >

Dtt~6 lt,,v

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

r ] Rl!JECTION: Seller rejects the foregoing offer.
(Suller'a·Sfgnaturo)

(Date)

(Tima)

(Sellen Signature)

OCopyrlght ~ AHOC~lfan of REM.TOR&$ 1.8,04 All RlglltS Rtltl'VIII

~

Page &of Spaun Seller's lnltia1a._ _ _ _ Date._ _ _ _ eu,an

(Date)

(llme}
UA~FORM1t

•&~
3227

